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INTRODUCTION
Public outcry over ever increasing incidents of sexual violence en-
couraged a number of state legislatures to enact laws requiring the
involuntary commitment of sexual predators.' Although sexually vio-
lent predator statutes date back at least fifty-five years, many states re-
pealed their sexually violent predator statutes in the 1970s "as concern
shifted from treating and rehabilitating individuals to prosecution and
punishment of those individuals."2 Modem sexually violent predator
statutes differ substantially from the earlier treatment-oriented laws,
because they mandate civil commitment for treatment and confine-
ment subsequent to the completion of a criminal sentence. Currently,
sixteen jurisdictions have sexually violent predator statutes.3 These
1 See Claudine M. Leone, New Jersey Assembly Bill 155, A Bill Allowing the Civil Commit-
ment of Vwlent Sex Offenders After the Completion of a Criminal Sentence, 18 SEroN HALL LEGIS.J.
890 (1994) (describing public outrage over and legislative response to the release of Don-
ad Chapman); Marie A. Bochnewich, Comment, Prediction of Dangerousness and Washing-
ton's Sexually Viwlent Predator Statute, 29 CAL. W. L. REv. 277 (1992) (referring to the public
outcry in Washington State that led to the enactment of its sexually violent predator stat-
ute); Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Vwlent Predators in Kan-
sas: A Modem Law for Modern Times, 42 KAN. L. Rxv. 887 (1994) (detailing the creation of
Kansas' Task Force on Sex Offenders by a couple whose daughter was raped and murdered
by a released offender with a history of violent sexual offenses).
2 McCaffrey, supra note 1, at 889.
3 California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, Nevada, NewJersey, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia currently have sexual predator laws. See CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 6250
(West 1994 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-13-201 to -216 (1986 & Supp. 1996);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-566 to -567 (West 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3501 to -
3511 (1989 & Supp. 1990); ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/1.01 to 12 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 59-2901 to -2941 (1995); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 123A, §§ 1-9 (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp.
1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 253B.18 (1994 & Supp. 1997); NEB. Rrv. STAT. §§ 29-2922 to
2936 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:47-1 to 2C:47-8 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-6-301 to 305 (1984 & Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-16-1 to -5 (1995); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-300 to -302 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.06.005 to -.270 (1992).
Although only sixteen jurisdictions today have sexually violent predator laws, in 1960,
twenty-six states and the District of Columbia had sexual psychopath statutes. See Gary
Gleb, Comment, Washington's Sexually Vwlent Predator Law: the Need to Bar Unreliable Psychiat-
ric Predictions of Dangerousness from Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. Rv. 213, 215
(1991); see also Alan H. Swanson, Comment, Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analy.
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laws vary in composition, and, as evidenced by the articles opposing
their enactment, they certainly have not yet received universal
acceptance. 4
Opponents argue that the penal system, not the civil should han-
dle the commitment of sexually violent predators. 5 This argument re-
flects one controversy over these statutes-whether they are truly civil
in nature.6 But the issues surrounding sexually violent predator stat-
utes extend far beyond a distinction between the civil or criminal na-
ture of the laws. The statutes also implicate due process, 7 double
jeopardy,8 and ex post facto9 concerns. Opponents attest that the stat-
utes are criminal, and therefore, violate ex post facto and doublejeop-
ardy prohibitions.10 They also argue that the sexual predator statutes
violate due process guarantees and court-created doctrines because
commitment relies on unreliable psychiatric predictions of future
dangerousness," as well as mental conditions that retain no fixed
meaning to psychiatric professionals. 12
Proponents of sexual predator statutes, on the other hand, sup-
port the civil commitment of sexual predators on both moral and
practical grounds.' 3 From a moral perspective, when discussing vio-
lent sexual offenses, intellectual arguments easily give way to emo-
tional ones. From a pragmatic perspective, proponents focus on
sexual assault as the product of mental illness and, consequently, sup-
port institutionalizing sexual offenders indefinitely for treatment. 14
sis, 51J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 215, 228-35 (1960). Legislatures in Alaska, Florida, Loui-
siana, Michigan, Mississippi, New York, Texas, and Vermont introduced legislation
proposing involuntary commitment schemes for sexual predators in 1995. See H.R. 33,
19th Leg., 1st Sess., 1995 Alaska; S. 56, Reg. Sess., 1995 Fla.; H.a. 1602, Reg. Sess., 1995 La.;
H.R. 5245, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1995 Mich.; H.R. 114, Reg. Sess., 1995 Miss.; S. 2734,
218th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 N.Y.; H.R. 595, 74th Reg. Sess., 1995 Tex.; S. 9, Bien-
nial Sess., 1995 Vt. InJanuary, 1995, Hawaii's legislature introduced a similar scheme, but
withdrew it two weeks later. See H.R. 1010, 18th Leg., 1995 Haw.
4 SeeJohn Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Viwlent Predators Statute: Law orLottery? A
Response to Professor Brooks, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. Rxv. 755 (1992); see alsoJames D. Rear-
don, Sexual Predators: Mental Illness or Abnormality? A Psychiatrist's Perspective, 15 U. PUGET
SOUND L. R v. 849 (1992).
5 SeeJulie Shapiro, Sources of Security, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 843 (1992).
6 See infra Part IIAl.b and note 49; see alsoTimothy Michael Blood, Proceedings Under
Washington's New Statutory Scheme Providing for the Indefinite Involuntary Commitment of Sexually
Vriolent Predators are Civil, Not Crimina4 In Nature, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 855 (1992).
7 See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 748-51 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
8 See id. at 753-54.
9 See id. at 751-53.
10 See Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly Committing Nio-
lent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. Rxv. 709, 718 (1992).
11 See Gleb, supra note 3, at 222-28.
12 See La Fond, supra note 4, at 770-79.
13 See Brooks, supra note 10.
14 See BARBARA K ScHwARTz & HENRY R. CELLINi, THE SEX OFFENDER: CORRECTIONS,
TREATMENT AND LEGAL PRACnCE 2-2 (1995).
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Pursuant to the dictates of Foucha v. Louisiana,15 a case in which the
Supreme Court upheld confinement of insanity acquitees based on
dangerousness and mental illness, proponents argue that the sexual
predator statutes survive due process challenges similar to any other
civil commitment scheme.' 6 If one classifies the sexual predator stat-
utes as civil, double jeopardy and ex post facto concerns evaporate
into a cloud of constitutionally permissible legislation.' 7 Advocates
further criticize opponents for relying on psychiatric, rather than
legal, definitions of mental illness as grounds to invalidate the
statutes. 18
This Note attempts to uncover the constitutional implications of
sexually violent predator laws as dictated by the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution. 19 Although extremely relevant issues, this Note does
not attempt to resolve the double jeopardy or ex post facto issues.
2 0
Instead, this Note explores whether the involuntary commitment of
sexual predators violates the substantive due process rights of a class
of prisoners that society views as less than human.
Part II sets forth the constitutional limitations on the state's
power to incapacitate dangerous persons by analyzing Supreme Court
decisions involving involuntary commitment statutes. It then explores
the background of sexually violent predator statutes, the class of per-
sons they effect, and the legal consequences of civil commitment by
focusing on the statutes promulgated by Washington State, Minne-
sota, and Wisconsin. The federal courts have not yet heard the sub-
stantive due process argument as applied to the Minnesota and
Wisconsin statutes, although a federal district court recently held
Washington's sexually violent predator law unconstitutional. 21 This
Note will analyze whether Minnesota's statute will be upheld on a due
process challenge in the federal courts and whether Washington's
statute will be upheld in the Ninth Circuit and ultimately in the
15 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
16 Seeid.
17 In reYoung, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
18 See Gleb, supra note 3.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20 Although resolution of the double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges depend
entirely upon defining these statutes as civil, the civil-criminal distinction is a collateral
issue when analyzing the substantive due process implications of the statutes. See discus-
sion infra Part II.A.l.b and note 49.
21 Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995). The Eighth Circuit held
that "Minnesota's civil commitment statutes are constitutional." Bailey v. Gardebring, 940
F.2d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 1991). The court specifically determined that the construction of
the statute by the Supreme Court of Minnesota was not constitutionally defective. The
court did not rule on any substantive due process implications of the statute. Instead, the
court determined the statute's constitutionality in the context of whether the statute re-
quires the state to discharge a civil committee before transferring the committee to the
custody of the Department of Corrections. See id.
1997]
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Supreme Court.2 2 This Note will also consider whether the legitimacy
of the state's power depends on legislative definitions of mental ill-
ness.23 This Note will concentrate on these issues and search for an-
swers in light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions concerning
involuntary commitment.
Part III analyzes the extent to which the state can incapacitate
sexually violent criminals without violating the Due Process Clause. It
also explores whether the modem predator laws fit within court-con-
structed rules that enforce the constitutional rights of prisoners. Fi-
nally, Part IV explains why these recent laws, modeled after the state
of Washington's legislation, do not violate the Due Process Clause. It
also discusses why the due process standards of involuntary commit-
ment, as set forth by the Supreme Court, become unclear as constitu-
tional law intersects with legal categories of mental illness.
II
BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Limitations on the State's Power to
Incapacitate Dangerous Persons
Although the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that no person be "deprived of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law,"24 the Constitution does not explicitly dictate
the limits of its doctrine. Instead, state legislatures must adhere to
court-constructed guidelines in order to insure that their laws fit
within a constitutionally permissible framework. Unfortunately, these
court-constructed rules dim upon intersection with statutory law.
22 On March 1, 1996, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the Kansas Sexually Vio-
lent Predator Act violated substantive due process, although it did not reach the double
jeopardy and ex post facto implications of the Act. Matter of Care and Treatment of Hen-
dricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996), stay granted, Kansas v. Hendricks, 116 S. Ct. 1540, cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 2522. On December 10, 1996, the United States Supreme Court heard
oral arguments in the case in order to consider the constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually
Violent Predator Act. The Court is expected to issue its opinion in the summer of 1997.
23 A Tennessee law classifies sex offenders as mentally ill persons-
"Sex offenders constitute a species of mentally ill persons in the eyes of the
general assembly, and where this tendency is pronounced, they should have
the same care and custody as mentally ill persons generally, and such per-
sons should be given continued care and treatment so long as their release
would constitute a threat to them or to the general public."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-6-302 (1995). The Sixth Circuit found the statute clearly labels
convicted sex offenders, but it only recommends and does not mandate involuntary treat-
ment. See Dean v. McWherter, 70 F.3d 43, 44 (6th Cir. 1995). Although the statute stigma-
tizes sex offenders' reputations and diminishes employment opportunities, the court
found that the statute does not deprive petitioners of due process. See id. at 46. Although
Dean does not deal specifically with whether sexual offenders are mentally ill, the court
accepted the classification as valid. See id. at 44-45.
24 U.S. CONST. amend. XlV.
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1. Supreme Court Decisions Concerning Civil Commitment Schemes
The Supreme Court has continually upheld civil commitment
schemes on various constitutional bases, although few cases specifi-
cally address substantive due process concerns. The Court repeatedly
holds that "civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection. '2 5 Adher-
ence to substantive due process guarantees insures that the govern-
ment will not engage in conduct that "shocks the conscience" 26 or
interferes with rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."27
The Supreme Court has insisted that a liberty interest be "fundamen-
tal, (a concept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify)," 28 as well as "an
interest traditionally protected by our society."29
Due to the "fundamental nature" of an individual's interest in
liberty,30 the state must present compelling interests in order to legiti-
mately incapacitate an individual. 31 Under this analysis, the state's
scheme must pass the Court's strict scrutiny test: "[w] here certain
'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation
limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state inter-
est,' . . . and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to
express only the legitimate state interests at stake."32 The courts apply
strict scrutiny when the challenged legislation involves a fundamental
right; however, when the legislation involves a lesser right, then the
state must only prove a "rational basis" for the challenged law.33 Be-
cause of the importance of an individual's right to liberty "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,"34 civil commitment
schemes must pass the Court's strict scrutiny test.35
25 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
26 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 17 (1952).
27 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
28 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989).
29 Id.
30 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
31 See id.
32 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
33 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
34 Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 304 (1990).
35 The majority in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1991), applied the strict scrutiny
test to the Louisiana statute when it required carefully limited circumstances and legiti-
mate and compelling government interests. See id. at 81. In his dissent in Foucha v. Louisi-
ana, 504 U.S. 71, 102 (1992) (Thomas,J, dissenting),Justice Thomas argued that "[t)o the
extent the Court invalidates the Louisiana scheme on the ground that it violates some
general substantive due process right to 'freedom from bodily restraint' that triggers strict
scrutiny, it is wrong-and dangerously so." Id. at 117. Justice Thomas agreed that freedom
from involuntary confinement lies at the heart of liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause, but he disagreed with the Court's inclination to equate liberty interest and funda-
mental right. See id.
1997] 5 9
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a. Baxstrom v. Herold-Civil Commitment Subsequent to Penal
Sentence
Baxstrom v. Herold36 introduced the Supreme Court's position on
civil commitment subsequent to a criminal sentence. In Baxstrom, a
prison physician certified Johnnie Baxstrom as insane while serving
his criminal sentence.3 7 Baxstrom, having been convicted previously
of second degree assault and sentenced to a penal term in a New York
state prison, was transferred to Dannemora State Hospital, a penal in-
stitution used to confine and care for male prisoners declared men-
tally ill while serving a criminal sentence.38 Prior to the termination
of Baxstrom's penal sentence, the director of Dannemora filed a peti-
tion requesting Baxstrom's civil commitment.3 9 At a hearing on the
petition, two examining physicians declared Baxstrom to be mentally
ill and in need of institutional care.40 On the day Baxstrom's penal
sentence expired, the Department of Mental Hygiene gained custody
of Baxstrom, although the Department determined Baxstrom unsuita-
ble for care in a civil hospital.
41
Baxstrom sought a writ of habeas corpus in state court. At the
hearing, an independent psychiatrist attested to Baxstrom's continu-
ing mental illness, and the court dismissed the writ.42 Baxstrom again
applied for a writ of habeas corpus, which was likewise dismissed be-
cause he failed to produce psychiatric evidence to disprove the testi-
mony from the prior hearing.43 The Appellate Division affirmed the
dismissal of the writ without opinion. 44
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that Baxstrom
was denied equal protection of the laws by the statutory procedure
under which a person may be civilly committed at the expiration of
his penal sentence without the jury review available to all other per-
sons civilly committed in New York. Petitioner was further denied
equal protection of the laws by his civil commitment to an institu-
tion maintained by the Department of Correction beyond the expi-
ration of his prison term without ajudicial determination that he is
dangerously mentally ill such as that afforded to all so committed
except those, like Baxstrom, nearing the expiration of a penal
sentence.
45
36 383 U.S. 107 (1966).




41 See id. at 109.
42 See id.
43 See id. According to the Court, Baxstrom's inability to produce adequate testimony
was "due to his indigence and incarceration." Id.
44 See People ex reL Baxstrom v. Herold, 251 N.Y.S.2d 938 (App. Div.).
45 Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 110 (1966).
600 [Vol. 82:594
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In resolving the equal protection challenge, the Court specifically
held that "[f] or purposes of granting judicial review before a jury of
the question whether a person is mentally ill and in need of institu-
tionalization, there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the com-
mitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all
other civil commitments."46 In subsequent cases the Court consist-
ently interpreted Baxstrom as requiring that "a convicted criminal who
allegedly was mentally ill [is] entitled to release at the end of his term
unless the State commit[s] him in a civil proceeding."47 Simply, Bax-
strom authorizes the civil commitment of criminals who complete their
statutorily required criminal sentences. 48 Based on this broad, albeit
accepted, reading of the Baxstrom holding, the Court essentially paved
the way for the commitment of sexually violent predators both in lieu
of and subsequent to completion of a criminal sentence.49
46 Id. at 111-12.
47 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992). The Court has since interpreted Bax-
strom to be applicable in other contexts as well, rather than reading the language in line
with the specific holding of the case. Therefore, the Foucha Court would uphold involun-
tary civil commitment, which afforded adequate procedural and substantive due process
protection, subsequent to a penal sentence. Conversely, in Justice Thomas's dissent, he
stated that "[i]f Foucha had been convicted of the crimes with which he was charged and
sentenced to the statutory maximum of 32 years in prison, the State would not be entitled
to extend his sentence at the end of that period. To do so would obviously violate the
prohibition on ex post facto laws." Fouha, 504 U.S. at 122 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted). Although Thomas argued that the State could continue to confine danger-
ous insanity acquittees, he found it "obviously quite different.., to assert that the State is
allowed to confine anyone who is dangerous for as long as it wishes." Id.
48 See Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 107.
49 The Baxstrom Court deemed civil commitment subsequent to a penal sentence to
be constitutionally permissible. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). In Alen v. I/!i-
nois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), the Court defined Illinois's Sexually Dangerous Persons Act to
be civil, rather than criminal, because the statute served to provide treatment, not punish-
ment to sexually dangerous persons. See id. at 369. The Court relied heavily upon the
conclusion of the Illinois Supreme Court that the law is essentially civil in nature, the
obligation of the state to provide care and treatment in order to effect recovery, and the
ability of the committed person to apply for release at any time. See id. at 369. The Allen
Court did not indicate that its analysis would differ if the commitment proceedings were
instituted subsequent to, rather than in lieu of, a criminal sentence.
Similar to the other cases involving civil commitment proceedings, a sharply divided
Court decided Allen v. Illinois. Id. The dissentingJustices (Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun) adamantly argued that the scheme was criminal in nature because of its rela-
tionship to Illinois's criminal law, as well as the central role the criminal law occupies in
the civil commitment proceedings. See id. at 377 (Stevens,J., dissenting). The dissent con-
cluded that the majority "permitt[ed] a State to create a shadow criminal law without the
fundamental protection of the Fifth Amendment [which] conflicts with the respect for
liberty and individual dignity that has long characterized, and that continues to character-
ize, our free society." Id. at 384 (Stevens,J., dissenting). -Additionally, inJackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715, 729-30 (1972), the Court specifically noted that it "cannot conclude that
pending criminal charges provide a greater justification for different treatment than con-
viction and sentence."
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b. Allen v. Illinois: Support for Finding Modem Sexually
Dangerous Persons Acts Civil in Nature
Although Baxstrom generally authorized the civil commitment of
criminals who complete their penal terms, the nature of sexually vio-
lent predator statutes must be examined in order to determine
whether they are criminal or civil in nature. In Allen v. Illinois,50 the
Supreme Court declared Illinois's sexually violent predator statute to
be civil in nature for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against self-incrimination. 5' Terry B. Allen was charged with unlawful
restraint and deviate sexual assault,52 after which the state filed a peti-
tion asking that he be declared a sexually dangerous person.53 An
Illinois Circuit Court ordered Allen to undergo two psychiatric exami-
nations.54 Although Allen objected to the elicitation of the psychiatric
information as violative of his privilege against self-incrimination, the
court found him to be a sexually dangerous person within the mean-
ing of the Illinois statute.55
The United States Supreme Court ultimately defined Illinois' Act
as civil in nature. The Court first looked to the Act's construction and
highlighted Illinois's express provision that the Act "shall be civil in
nature."56 It deferred to the conclusion of the Illinois Supreme Court
that the proceedings are civil in nature.57 The Allen majority found
that Illinois did not wish to punish, but instead, sought to treat sexu-
ally dangerous persons.58 Notwithstanding the fact that the proceed-
ings under the Illinois Act were compatible with those usually found
in criminal trials, the Court held that providing safeguards applicable
in criminal trials does not change civil proceedings into criminal
prosecutions.59
50 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
51 See id. at 374.
52 See id. at 365.
53 See id. The Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act at issue in Allen provides the
following definition:
All persons suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disorder has
existed for a period of not less than one year, immediately prior to the
filing of the petition hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal
propensities to the commission of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated
propensities towards acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of
children, are hereby declared sexually dangerous persons.
Id. at 366 n.1 (quoting 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/1.01 (West 1992)).
54 See id. at 366.
55 Se id.
56 Id. at 368 (quoting 725 ILL. COMp. STAT. 205/1:01 (West 1992)).
57 See id. at 369.
58 See id. at 370.
59 See id. at 372.
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Although the United States Supreme Court declared Illinois's
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act 60 to be civil in nature, that finding
does not automatically lead to the conclusion that other states' sexu-
ally violent predator statutes are also civil in nature. Illinois's Act au-
thorizes civil commitment in lieu of a criminal sentence, while statutes
such as Washington's allow for civil commitment subsequent to com-
pletion of a criminal sentence.61 Read together, however, the ratio-
nales of Baxstrom v. Herol 62 and Allen v. Illinois3 lead to the
conclusion that the commitment of a sexually violent predator subse-
quent to the completion of his penal term is also civil in nature. Bax-
strom held that the commitment of a prisoner nearing the expiration
of his penal term does not differ from other civil commitments. 64 Al-
len declared Illinois's sexually violent predator statute to be civil be-
cause it aimed to provide treatment rather than punishment to its
committees. 65 Based on these holdings, the fact that some modem
sexually violent predator statutes authorize commitment subsequent to
the completion of a penal term is irrelevant, provided that sexually
dangerous persons "are confined under conditions [ ]compatible with
the State's asserted interest in treatment."66
c. Addington v. Texas-Mentally Ill and Dangerous
Requirements
Although states legitimately institutionalize citizens through civil
proceedings, substantive due process demands certain restraints on
the state's discretion to commit its citizens. Addington v. Texas 7 de-
fines certain requirements necessary to detain individuals pursuant to
civil proceedings. In Addington, Frank Addington appealed an order
committing him to a Texas hospital for an indefinite period pursuant
to a Texas civil commitment statute. 68 The statute required that the
proposed patient be mentally ill, a condition which, in Texas, requires
hospitalization for the patient's own welfare or the protection of
others.69 The trial judge presented the jury with two questions: "(1)
Based on clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence, is Frank O'Neal
Addington mentally ill? (2) Based on clear, unequivocal and convinc-
ing evidence, does Frank O'Neal Addington require hospitalization in
60 725 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 205/1:01 et. seq. (West 1992).
61 WASH. REv. CODE § 71.09.030 (1992).
62 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
63 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
64 See Baxstromn, 383 U.S. at 110.
65 See Allen, 478 U.S. at 373.
66 Id.
67 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
68 See id. at 421. For the specific provisions of the statute, see Tax. CoDE CaUM. PROC.
ANN. art. 46.02 § 6 (West 1979) (amended 1989).
69 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 6(b) (3) (West 1979) (amended 1989).
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a mental hospital for his own welfare and protection or the protection
of others?"70 The jury answered both questions in the affirmative.
71
Addington argued that the standard for commitment violated his sub-
stantive due process rights, and that "any standard of proof for com-
mitment less than that required for criminal convictions.., violated
his procedural due process rights."7
2
A unanimous United States Supreme Court
concluded that the preponderance standard falls short of meeting
the demands of due process and that the reasonable-doubt standard
is not required, [and] turn [ed] to a middle level of burden of proof
that strikes a fair balance between the rights of the individual and
the legitimate concerns of the state.
73
The Court reasoned that in civil commitment proceedings, the
factfinder must be persuaded by proof greater than the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard.
7 4
Although the Addington Court resolved a procedural due process
issue of involuntary commitment, subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions cite Addington as defining the state's power to incapacitate indi-
viduals in civil commitment proceedings.75 The Addington Court
noted that
[t] he state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in
providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional
disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its
police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some
who are mentally ilL
76
In one sentence the Supreme Court broadly defined a state's power to
infringe upon the substantive due process rights of certain classes of
citizens. Specifically, the Supreme Court declared civil commitment
pursuant to the state's police power constitutionally permissible upon
a showing of dangerousness and mental illness.
d. United States v. Salerno-Regulatory Interests of the States
The mental illness and dangerousness requirements of Addington
v. Texas77 provide but one avenue through which the state may legiti-
mately commit individuals in civil proceedings. In United States v. Sa-
70 Addington, 441 U.S. at 421.
71 See id.
72 Id. at 421-22.
73 Id. at 431.
74 See id. at 432-33.
75 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987).
76 Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 (emphasis added).
77 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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/erno,7s the Supreme Court held that the Government's "regulatory
interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, out-
weigh an individual's liberty interest."79 The Supreme Court declared
the authorization of detention based on future dangerousness found
in the Bail Reform Act of 198480 to be permissible under the substan-
tive component of the Due Process Clause. The Court first noted that
the Act authorizes the commitment of only those individuals accused
of "the most serious of crimes,"8' and it then found the government's
interest in preventing crime by arrestees both compelling and legiti-
mate.8 2 Additionally, the Court highlighted Congress's finding that
individuals who fall into the class defined by the statute are "far more
likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the community after
arrest."83 The Court determined society's interest in crime prevention
to be at its greatest under the narrow circumstances prescribed by the
Act.
The Salerno Court reversed the Second Circuit's holding that "if a
person is not charged with a crime, he may not, consistent with the
principles of due process, be incarcerated simply on the ground that
he is likely to commit a crime. 84 Although not presented with the
precise issue, the Second Circuit reasoned that " U]ust as the Due Pro-
cess Clause would prohibit incarcerating a person not even accused of
a crime in order to prevent his future crimes, it would equally barpreven-
tive detention of a person who has been convicted of past crimes and has served
his sentence."'85 Finally, the Second Circuit analogized persons who
complete criminal sentences to those not yet charged with a crime,
and ultimately found that detaining either violated the Due Process
Clause.8
6
The Supreme Court disagreed. Balanced against the state's inter-
est in detaining dangerous persons prior to trial, the Supreme Court
78 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
79 Id. at 748. The Court cited examples in which the Court upheld civil commitment
schemes in order to protect public safety. Most notably, the Court cited Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418 (1979), which upheld the government's power to detain mentally unstable
individuals who present a danger to the public, andJackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972),
which upheld the government's power to detain dangerous defendants who become in-
competent to stand trial.
80 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et. seq. (1984).
81 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1984) (detention hearings avail-
able in cases involving crimes of violence, offenses for which the sentence imposed is life
imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses and for certain repeat offenders).
82 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749.
83 Id. at 750 (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1983).
84 United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 1986).
85 Id. (quoting United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1001 (2d Cir. 1986)
(emphasis added). Although the Second Circuit determined that a person who completes
his criminal sentence for crimes of which he was found guilty may not be incarcerated to
protect the public, it cited no authority for this proposition. See id. at 72-73.
86 See id. at 73. See also U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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recognized that, in "circumstances where the government's interest is
sufficiently weighty, ' 87 an "individual's strong interest in liberty...
may be subordinated to the greater needs of society."88 The Court
then concluded that Congress's "careful delineation of the circum-
stances under which detention will be permitted satisfies this stan-
dard."8 9 The Supreme Court upheld the pretrial detention of a
certain class of arrestees, although not yet convicted of any particular
offense, based solely on clear and convincing evidence of a threat to
society.90 In addition, the Court cited the Speedy Trial Act 9' as impos-
ing stringent time limitations on the length of pretrial detention.92
Without more, the Supreme Court declined to further address time
constraints on the pretrial detention authorized by the Bail Reform
Act.98
The Salerno Court was not directly confronted with the issue of
detaining a dangerous individual subsequent to completion of a crimi-
nal sentence in order to protect society. However, the Court resolved
an analogous issue by upholding a statute authorizing the detention
of a class of arrestees, not yet proven guilty of the alleged crime, based
only on a perceived threat to society.9 4 Although the state must pro-
vide certain procedural safeguards in order to commit individuals, the
Supreme Court did not define the substantive due process limitations
on the power of the state to detain those who present a danger to
society.9 5
87 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
88 Id. at 750-51.
89 Id. at 751.
90 See id.
91 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1982 & Supp. III).
92 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747. With this citation, the Court attempted to adequately
address the concern of the Second Circuit that "the Due Process Clause prohibits pretrial
detention on the ground of danger to the community as a regulatory measure, without
regard to the duration of the detention." United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir.
1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
95 Although the Supreme Court was not concerned specifically with time limitations,
Chief Judge Feinberg's dissenting opinion in the Second Circuit argued that a pretrial
detention for dangerousness "does not violate the Due Process Clause when there is clear
and convincing proof that a person already under indictment for a serious crime would
commit another crime if released, if the detention has not continued so long as to consti-
tute punishment." Salerno, 794 F.2d at 75 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). Concerned through-
out his opinion about the length of confinement, ChiefJudge Feinberg concluded that the
"built-in limit on the length of the period for which an accused person may be detained"
adequately addressed his concerns and contributed to his decision to uphold the Bail Re-
form Act on due process grounds. Id. at 77-78.
94 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987).
95 See David Boemer, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word, 15 U. PUGET
SOUND L. Ray. 525, 542 (1992).
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e. Foucha v. Louisiana-Mentally Ill and Dangerous
Requirements Revisited
Five years after United States v. Salerno,9 6 the Supreme Court con-
sidered the substantive due process limitations imposed upon the
state in civil commitment proceedings. In Foucha v. Louisiana,97 an
insanity acquittee challenged a Louisiana statute calling for civil com-
mitment subsequent to an acquittal by reason of insanity.98 A two-
member sanity commission reported that Foucha "[was] in remission
from mental illness but [they could not] certify that he would not
constitute a menace to himself or others if released."99 One doctor
further testified that Foucha had an antisocial personality not amena-
ble to treatment rather than a mental disease. 100 The Court held that
the statute violated substantive and procedural due process protec-
tions,101 primarily because the statute "allows a person acquitted by
reason of insanity to be committed to a mental institution until he is
able to demonstrate that he is not dangerous to himself and others,
even though he does not suffer from any mental illness."' 0 2
The Foucha majority referred to Addington v. Texas,103 in which
the Court required a "burden equal to or greater than the 'clear and
convincing' standard" in order to meet due process guarantees in de-
termining mental illness.104 In Addington, the Court stated that "the
state has authority under its police power to protect the community
from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill."' 0 5 Pri-
marily concerned with the burden of proof necessary to commit an
individual to a mental institution in a civil proceeding, the Addington
Court concluded that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was "one way
to impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision and
thereby perhaps to reduce the chances that inappropriate commit-
ments will be ordered.'u0 6 The Addington Court considered civil com-
96 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
97 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
98 See id. at 73. The Court recognized that insanity acquittees and persons subject to
civil commitment are not similarly situated, and that the States may treat the two differ-
ently. See id. at 85-86.
99 Id. at 74-75.
100 See id. at 75.
101 See id. at 83.
102 Id. at 73.
103 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
104 Id. at 433.
105 Id. at 426.
106 Id. at 427. The Court's concern focused on commitment based on abnormal be-
havior "which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disor-
der, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." Id. at 426-
27. In order to insure that a factfinder would not choose to commit an individual based
only on isolated instances of unusual conduct, the Court ruled that due process requires
confinement by proof "more substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence." Id.
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mitment proceedings appropriate only when the court determines an
individual is both mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or
others.'0 7 However, the Addington Court used mental disorder and
mental illness interchangeably, which consequently raises doubts
about the precise definition the Court attaches to the mental illness
requirement. 08 In demanding proof greater than preponderance of
the evidence, the Addington Court attempted to insure that loss of lib-
erty would incur only with "a showing that the individual suffers from
something more serious than is demonstrated by idiosyncratic
behavior."' 09
The Foucha Court also relied on O'Connor v. Donaldson," 0 in
which the Court held that "there is no constitutional basis for confin-
ing [mentally ill] persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no
one and can live safely in prison.""' O'Connor stands for the proposi-
tion that a state cannot constitutionally confine a harmless, mentally
ill person." 2 The issue in Foucha, however, involved whether a state
can constitutionally confine an individual determined to have a per-
sonality disorder who poses a danger to himself or others." 3 The
Foucha majority's concern focused on civil commitment schemes al-
lowing for indefinite detention based on a past criminal act and an
antisocial personality that occasionally leads to aggressive conduct. 114
According to the Court, upholding commitment based on past crimi-
nal conduct and antisocial personality features:
would permit the State to hold indefinitely any other insanity ac-
quittee not mentally ill who could be shown to have a personality
disorder that may lead to criminal conduct. The same would be true of
any convicted criminal, even though he has completed his prison term. It
would also be only a step away from substituting confinements for
dangerousness for our present system which, with only narrow excep-
tions and aside from permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcer-
ates only those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have
violated a criminal law.1
5
107 See id. at 429. Additionally, the Court included necessary therapy as a defining
factor in determining the appropriateness of civil commitment. The opinion does not
clarify whether the Due Process Clause or simply the Texas statute at issue in the case
requires this factor. See id. at 428 n.4 ("The State of Texas confines only for the purpose of
providing care designed to treat the individual.").
108 Compare, e.g., Salerno, 441 U.S. at 426 (referring to "mental or emotional disorder")
and id. at 429 (using the term "mental illness").
109 Id. at 426-27.
110 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
M1 id. at 575.
112 See id. at 576.
113 See Foucha 504 U.S. at 73.
114 See id. at 82.
115 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82 (1987) (emphasis added). Allen v. Illinois, 478
U.S. 364 (1986), stands in contrast to Foucha v. Louisiana and Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
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The Court distinguished the detention scheme challenged in United
States v. Salerno as a narrowly focused and carefully limited exception
permitted by the Due Process Clause.11 6 The Foucha Court refused to
define Louisiana's involuntary commitment scheme as either.
1 7
Concurring, Justice O'Connor narrowly defined the Court's opin-
ion as addressing only the specific statutory scheme before it.118
O'Connor would accord great deference to reasonable legislative
judgments about the nexus between behavior and mental illness" 9-a
principle expressed inJones v. United States.'20 InJones, the Court held
that "the finding of insanity at the criminal trial [is] sufficiently proba-
tive of mental illness and dangerousness tojustify [civil] commitment"
subsequent to a not guilty verdict by reason of insanity.' 2 ' Justice
O'Connor implicitly accepted a broadened scope through which the
state can involuntarily detain individuals by requiring only "some
medical justification" for confining mental patients.
122
Justice Kennedy's dissent quickly turned the logic of the majority
on its head. He faulted the majority for relying on O'Connor and Add-
ington which set parameters for involuntary civil commitment, while
Foucha dealt specifically with the criminal context.123 Justice Kennedy
argued that the cases cited by the majority stand for "the proposition
that in civil proceedings the Due Process Clause requires the State to
prove both insanity and dangerousness by clear and convincing evi-
dence."' 2 4 Justice Kennedy did not specifically require mental illness,
but instead required proof of insanity, yet again undefined. Justice
Kennedy recognized that "it is now well established that insanity as
defined by the criminal law has no direct analog in medicine or sci-
418 (1979). In Alen, the Court declared Illinois's Sexually Dangerous Persons Act not
criminal for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation. The Court accepted the Illinois Supreme Court's unanimous holding that the
state's sexually dangerous persons statute sought primarily to provide treatment, not pun-
ishment for those "suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disorder has existed for
a period of not less than one year, coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of
sex offenses." Allen 478 U.S. at 366-67 n.1. Although the issue on appeal did not concern
substantive due process and the Court did not specifically address it, the Court, likewise,
expressed no concern about a civil commitment scheme based on a mental disorder.
116 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 81-82.
117 See id. at 83.
118 See id. at 86 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
119 See id. at 87.
120 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
121 Id. at 374 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86. Although Justice O'Connor specifically wrote about the
mental health of insanity acquittees, she clearly stated that the State's commitment scheme
must give due regard to the particular crime for which the individual was acquitted by
reasons of insanity. See id.




ence." 125 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that present sanity would be
a relevant inquiry if the state commits an individual pursuant to a civil
scheme.'
26
Filing a separate dissent, Justice Thomas criticized the majority
for falling to set forth a standard applicable to judge the substantive
due process implications of the statute and for not explaining what, if
any, fundamental right the statute implicated.' 27 Thomas argued that
the Court historically and consistently applied a deferential standard
of review to state laws involving involuntary confinement of the men-
tally ill. He criticized the majority for employing the strict scrutiny test
when it ruled Louisiana's scheme violative of substantive due process
because it was not sharply focused or carefully limited.'28 Thomas re-
verted to the substantive due process analysis on which the Court in
Jones relied: "[D]id the means chosen by Congress (commitment of
insanity acquittees until they have recovered their sanity or are no
longer dangerous) reasonably fit Congress' ends (treatment of the ac-
quittee's mental illness and protection of society from his dangerous-
ness)?"1 29 Justice Thomas apparently would require a state to meet
the less demanding burden of the rational basis test under a challenge
to its civil commitment legislation.
Justice Thomas also criticized the majority for defining Louisi-
ana's scheme as indefinite, because the scheme entitled insanity ac-
quittees to annual release hearings at their request.8 0 Additionally,
"Louisiana's statute provides for 'indefinite' commitment only to the
extent that an acquittee is unable to satisfy the substantive standards
for release."' 31 Finally,Justice Thomas found the Louisiana scheme at
least substantively reasonable, 132 although he made no attempt to de-
fend the law under the more narrow strict scrutiny analysis.
Understanding the limitations on the state's authority to incapac-
itate potential civil committees is central to determining the constitu-
tionality of modem sexually violent predator statutes. Subsequent to
defining modem sexually violent predator statutes as civil in nature
125 Id. at 96. See alsoJoHN BIGGS,JR., THE GUILTY MIND 117 (1955) ("[T]he divergence
between law and psychiatry is caused in part by the legal fiction represented by the words
'insanity' or 'insane,' which are a kind of lawyer's catchall and have no clinical meaning.").
126 See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 96.
127 See id. at 116 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
128 See id. at 117. Justice Thomas admitted that the standard of review applied in
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), required a carefully limited scheme. However,
he questioned whether the same standard should apply in the present case, and faulted the
Court for not explicitly defining the standard used to reach its conclusion that Louisiana's
involuntary commitment scheme is unconstitutional. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 117.
129 Id. at 120-21.
130 See id. at 124.
131 Id. at 123.
132 See id.
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and reviewing Supreme Court precedents concerning the state's
power to commit individuals pursuant to civil commitment proceed-
ings, an introduction to the structure, purposes, and case law sur-
rounding sexually violent predator statutes uncovers the recent
controversies surrounding the laws.
B. Modem Sexually Violent Predator Statutes
1. Washington State's Sexually Violent Predator Act
Washington was the first state to enact a sexually violent predator
statute authorizing civil commitment subsequent to completion of a
penal sentence. Washington first addressed the release of violent sex
offenders from prison who are not determined to be mentally ill, but
who continue to pose a tremendous danger to the community.'
33
Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Act serves as an interesting
example of the modem statutes due to the tremendous controversy
surrounding the statute's unique procedural structure, substantive im-
plications, and recent judicial scrutiny.
a. Legislative History
Washington's legislature enacted the Sexually Violent Predator
Act in response to the 1989 attack of a Washington boy by a repeat
sexual offender, 3 4 Earl Kenneth Shriner, whose criminal history
dated back to 1966.135 The state, considering Shriner extremely dan-
gerous but not amenable to psychiatric treatment, released him from
prison in 1987. Despite Shriner's "unusual sexually sadistic fantasies
with plans to carry them out,"'3 6 the state's civil commitment laws did
not allow for commitment without a recent overt act of dangerous-
ness.' 37 Two years after his release, Shriner violently raped, stabbed,
strangled, and sexually mutilated a seven year old boy.138 The com-
munity reacted strongly to the attack and, consequently, established
the Task Force on Community Protection to examine the criminal sys-
tem and effectively deal with repeat sex offenders.'
39
The Task Force on Community Protection evaluated and pro-
posed changes in the law.' 40 "The [t]ask [florce found 'gaps' in the
existing system of determinate, but short, sentencing ranges and in-
definite, but inapplicable, involuntary commitment laws."' 41 It con-
133 See Leone, supra note 1, at 890-91.
134 See id. at 891 n.7.
135 See Boerner, supra note 95, at 526.
1386 Gleb, supra note 3, at 213.
137 SeeWAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020 (West 1992).
138 See Boerner, supra note 95, at 529.
139 See id. at 537-38.
140 See id. at 538.
141 Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 746 n.1 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
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ducted six public hearings throughout Washington "to discover what
citizens believe d were] the major flaws in [their] state's laws regard-
ing sexual and violent offenders."'142 Although the findings of the
Task Force contained emotional narratives of members of the public,
they also relied on statistics and reports which documented the nature
of sexual offenses including information from the United States Sur-
geon General, the Centers for Disease Control, and the Bureau ofJus-
tice Statistics. 143
In adopting the statute authorizing the indefinite commitment of
sexual predators, the Washington legislature found that the existing
involuntary treatment act, intended as a short-term civil commitment
system for individuals with serious mental disorders, was inappropriate
for the "small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent
predators... who do not have a mental disease or defect."' 44 Instead,
the legislature determined that this group of sexual offenders suffered
from antisocial personality features unamenable to existing mental ill-
ness treatment methods. 145 The legislature determined the potential
for curing sexually violent offenders was unlikely, and concluded that
the treatment needs for this population are both long-term and non-
traditional. 146 The legislature further found that the recidivism rates
of sexually violent predators were extremely high. 47 The existing
commitment act inadequately addressed the group's risk of reoffend-
ing primarily because offenders do not have access to potential victims
during confinement and therefore will not engage in the overt act
required by the involuntary treatment act for continued
confinement.
48
Although not all states adhere to its precise framework, many
states have modeled their sexually violent predator laws after that of
Washington. For example, Kansas patterned its predator act after
Washington's statute, relying in part on the Washington Supreme
Court's decision to uphold the statute and the civil commitment
scheme as consistent with federal constitutional guarantees. 149 In ad-
142 J. Christopher Rideout, So What's In a Name? A Rhetorical Reading of Washington's
Sexually Violent Predators Ac4 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 781, 787 (1992).
143 See id. at 786, 788.





149 See McCaffrey, supra note 1, at 889; see also In reYoung, 857 P.2d 989, 1018 (Wash.
1993) (upholding the constitutionality of the Sexually Violent Predator Act).
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dition, Iowa,150 Wisconsin,151 and NewJersey152 recently enacted sexu-
ally violent predator statutes. Likewise, legislatures in Arkansas, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island, and South Carolina are considering sexually
violent predator laws consistent with the Washington statute.15
b. Substantive Aspects of the Statute
Washington's statute defines a sexually violent predator as an in-
dividual "who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual
violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of
sexual violence." 154 Although the statute does not define personality
disorder, it defines a "mental abnormality" as a "congenital or ac-
quired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which
predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a
degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of
others."155 The statute defines predatory acts as "acts directed towards
strangers or individuals with whom a relationship has been established
or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization."1 56
Pursuant to Washington's statute, the state can initiate the invol-
untary commitment process prior to the expiration of the defendant's
criminal sentence for a sexually violent offense, prior to the release of
a person incompetent to stand trial on a sexually violent offense
charge, or upon a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity for a per-
son charged with committing a sexually violent offense. 157 Either the
county prosecutor or attorney general files a petition alleging that the
defendant is a sexually violent offender, 58 and ajudge makes a prob-
able cause determination. 59 If probable cause exists, the judge di-
rects the person to be taken into custody and transferred to a facility
for evaluation "by a person deemed to be professionally qualified to
conduct such an examination pursuant to rules developed by the De-
150 IOWA CODE § 709(C) (1995).
151 Wis. STAT. § 980 (1994); see also Erich C. Straub &James E. Kachelski, The Constitu-
tionality of Wisconsin's Sexual PredatorLaw, 68 Wis. LAw. 14 (1995) (discussing arguments of
opponents and proponents of the statute and questioning the statute's constitutionality).
152 NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:47-1 to 8 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990); Leone, supra note 1, at
892-94 (describing the legislative history of NewJersey's Sexually Violent Predator's Act of
1993).
153 See, e.g., 18th Ark. Leg., 2d Sess. (1994); H. 396, 120th Ohio Gen. Ass., 1993-94 Reg.
Sess. (1993); H. 3218, 67th Or. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993); H. 8350, RI. Reg. Sess. (1994); H.
3193, 1993 S.C. Statewide Sess. (1993); see Leone, supra note 1, at 892 n.8.
154 WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (1992).
155 Id. § 71.09.020(2).
156 Id. § 71.09.020(3).
157 Id. § 71.09.030.
158 Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 747 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (citing WASH. REv.




partment of Social and Health Services."'1 60 The statute entitles the
detainee to a trial within forty-five days, the right to counsel and ex-
perts, and affords both parties the right to a jury trial.' 6 ' Either the
jury or the court determines, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the
person falls within the statute's definition of a sexually violent
predator. 62 If resolved in the affirmative, then the state commits the
sexually violent predator to a secure facility under the control of the
Department of Social and Health Services for control, care, and treat-
ment until the Department determines the person safe to be
released.163
Due to security problems, the statute forbids sexually violent
predators from being detained in state mental facilities or regional
rehabilitation centers. 64 Instead, sexually violent predators must be
confined in facilities located within correctional institutions.165 The
statute does not specify treatment requirements, although the mental
condition of the committed person is evaluated once each year.
66
Both care and treatment must conform to "constitutional
requirements."1 67
A detainee must petition the court to obtain release. Subsequent
to a determination by the Secretary of the Department of Social and
Health Services that "the person's mental abnormality or personality
disorder has so changed that the person is not likely to commit preda-
tory acts of violence if released," 68 the Secretary authorizes the de-
tainee to file a petition.' 69 A hearing must be held within forty-five
days, and the state must again prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the petitioner is not safe to be at large as a result of his mental condi-
tion, and will likely engage in predatory acts of violence if dis-
charged. 170 Absent authorization by the Secretary, the detainee may
still petition the court for release.' 7 ' The Secretary must annually pro-
vide the detainee written notice of his right to petition the court with-
160 See i&2
161 WASH. REv. CODE § 71.09.050 (1992).
162 See id.
163 See id. § 71.09.060(1).
164 See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 747 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (citing WASH. REv.
CODE § 71.09.060(3) (1992)).
165 See id.
166 See id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.070 & .080 (1992)).
167 Id.
168 WASH. RE. CODE § 71.09.090(1); see ahsoYoungv. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744,747-48
(W.D. Wash. 1995) (describing Washington's Sexual Predator Act, WASH. REv. CODE
§§ 71.090, 71.100 (1992)).
169 See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 747 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (citing WASH. REv.
CODE § 71.09.090(1) (1992)).
170 See id.
171 See id. (citing WASH. REv. CODE § 71.09.090(2) (1992)).
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out prior approval.' 72 If the detainee chooses to exercise his right to
petition, the court must conduct a show cause hearing to determine
whether sufficient facts exist to warrant a hearing on whether the de-
tainee is safe to be at large.' 78 Although not entitled to be present at
the show cause hearing, the detainee is entitled by statute to represen-
tation by counsel. 174 If probable cause exists, the court must hold a
hearing similar to the original commitment hearings.'7 5 Absent these
annual review procedures, "unless the petition contains facts upon
which a court could find that the condition of the petitioner had so
changed that a hearing was warranted,"176 the detainee has no right to
a hearing on a petition for release.
2. Constitutional Challenges of Modern Sexually Violent Predator
Statutes
a. Washington-Young v. Weston
Young v. Weston,' 77 currently pending on appeal in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, reflects the legal issues implicated by these predator statutes and,
more generally, the scope of the state's authority to incapacitate indi-
viduals who pose potential threats to society.178 Young's criminal his-
tory includes six convictions for violent felony rape. 79 One day
before Young's release from prison for a 1985 rape conviction, the
state filed a petition under its sexually violent predator statute. The
state confined Young in a special commitment center from October
24, 1990 until his trial in February 1991.180 Young refused to partici-
pate in psychiatric evaluations, and the state prohibited his attend-
ance at a pretrial hearing in mid-January 1991, at which the Superior
Court rejected constitutional challenges to the statute.181 Subsequent
to ajury determination of his status as a sexually violent predator, the
court committed Young to a treatment facility pursuant to its sexually
violent predator statute. 182
Young originally challenged the constitutionality of the sexual
predator statute on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds.'83
The Washington Supreme Court determined en banc that "[i]n light
of the Statute's language and legislative history ... it is clear that the
172 See id.
173 See id. at 748.
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 WASH. REV. CODE § 71.090.090(2) (1992).
177 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
178 See id.
179 See In reYoung, 857 P.2d 989, 994 (1993) (en ban.c).
180 SeeYoung v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 748 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
181 See In reYoung, 857 P.2d at 994.
182 See id.
183 See id. at 996.
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Legislature intended a civil statutory scheme."'8 4 Relying on Allen v.
Illinois,18 5 the United States Supreme Court case holding Illinois's sex-
ually violent predator statute civil in nature for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment's protection against self-incrimination, the Washington
Supreme Court analogized its sexual predator law to the Illinois stat-
ute at issue in Allen.'8 6 Unlike Washington's sexually violent predator
statute, Illinois's sexually violent predator act provides for commit-
ment in lieu of a criminal sentence.'87 Notwithstanding this differ-
ence, the Washington Supreme Court, based on the language, history,
purposes, and effect of the statute, ultimately found the state's sexu-
ally violent predator statute civil in nature. 8 8 Because the prohibi-
tions against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws only apply to
criminal measures, the Washington Supreme Court reasoned that
Washington's predator statute did not violate these constitutional
prohibitions.1
8 9
Young also argued that the statute violated his substantive due
process rights. 190 The Federal Constitution requires that a person
shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.191 Because an individual's liberty interest is a fundamental
right,192 the court applied strict scrutiny which, declares constitutional
only those state laws that further compelling state interests and are
narrowly drawn to serve those compelling interests.' 93 The court
found the state's asserted interest in treating sexual predators and
protecting society from sexual predators to be compelling.'9 4 In or-
der to permit civil commitment under the Due Process Clause, a per-
184 Id. at 997.
185 478 U.S. 364 (1986); see discussion supra Part II.A.l.b.
186 See In re Young, 857 P.2d at 997. Although Alen involved the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination, then Justice Rehnquist determined the
proceedings civil due to its aim to provide treatment, not punishment, for sexually danger-
ous persons. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 373. Although the Act provides safeguards similar to
those applicable in criminal proceedings, such safeguards did not make the proceedings
criminal. See id. at 371-72. The Supreme Court found that the Act did not promote "the
traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence." See id. at 370 (quoting Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)). See supra Part IIA.I.b.
187 ILL. Comp. STAT. 205/1:01 et seq. (West 1992).
188 See In re Young, 857 P.2d at 996-99.
189 See id. at 996-100 (concluding that "[diouble jeopardy does not apply, however,
unless the sanction sought to be imposed in the second proceeding is punitive in nature so
that the proceeding is essentially criminal."); see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,
448 (1989) (a "civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanc-
tion as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment").
190 See In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1000-04.
191 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CoNsr. amend. XV, § 1.
192 See In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1001 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750
(1987)).
193 See id. at 1000 (citing State v. Farmer, 805 P.2d 200, 208 (Wash. 1991); In re
Schuoler, 723 P.2d 1103, 1108 (Wash. 1986)).
194 See In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1000.
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son must be both mentally ill and dangerous.195  Although
Washington State's sexually violent predator statute requires proof of
a "mental abnormality or personality disorder" for civil commit-
ment,196 the court determined that the Supreme Court "has always
used the term 'mentally ill' interchangeably with 'mentally disor-
dered.'1 97 On this basis, the court overruled Young's substantive due
process objections.
Subsequent to the Washington Supreme Court's ruling, the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
held in Young v. Weston'9 8 that Washington's sexually violent predator
statute is an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clause, 199
the Ex Post Facto Clause, 200 and the Double Jeopardy Clause.20 The
court determined that "[tihe essential component missing from the
Sexually Violent Predator Statute is the requirement that the detainee
be mentally ill."202 The court considered the legislature's findings
that "sexual predators 'have antisocial personality features which are
unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities,' and for
which the prognosis of cure is poor."20 3 The Washington State Psychi-
atric Association's Amicus Brief similarly attested that "the term
'mental abnormality' retains neither a clinically significant meaning
nor a recognized diagnostic use among treatment professionals."204
Finally, the court used the act's legislative history to prove that the.
state intended to involuntarily commit persons regardless of mental
health.205 Based upon these conclusions, the court determined that
Washington's statute violated the substantive protection of the Due
Process Clause.20 6
The district court next considered Young's ex post facto chal-
lenge. Contrary to the conclusions reached by the Washington
195 SeeAddington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (must have proof of mental illness
and dangerousness); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-78 (1992) (noting that in
certain circumstances persons who pose a danger to others or to the community may be
subject to limited confinement).
196 WASH. REv. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (1992).
197 In reYoung, 857 P.2d at 1001.
198 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
199 See id. at 750.
200 See id. at 753.
201 See id. at 754.
202 Id. at 749.
203 Id.; see WAH. REv. CODE § 71.09.010 (1992).
204 Young, 898 F. Supp. at 750.
205 See id. "Under current laws, sexually violent predators only qualify for civil deten-
tion when a mental illness or mental disorder is present. The Task Force examined the
histories of some individual violent predators who had been judged not to have a mental
illness or mental disorder and therefore were not detainable." Id. (citing Task Force on





Supreme Court, the district court defined the statute as criminal in
nature, primarily because it applies to criminal behavior and pro-
motes the traditional aims of punishment.20 7 The court found the
statute both retrospective and disadvantageous, and, therefore in vio-
lation of the Constitution's ex post facto prohibition.208
Finally, the court considered the statute's double jeopardy impli-
cations. The court found that Washington's statute punishes the indi-
vidual twice: once criminally for the commission of a violent sexual
offense and once civilly under the commitment scheme.20 9 Because
the statute primarily serves the traditional aims of punishment and
secondarily provides treatment, the court concluded that the statute
also violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.
2 10
Until Young's case is decided by the Ninth Circuit, Young will
remain in detention.21 ' At the very least, the district court's ruling
raises serious doubts about the constitutionality of the civil commit-
ment scheme of Washington's sexually violent predator statute, a
scheme many states have replicated in a similar attempt to detain sex-
ually violent predators for the public's safety.
b. Minnesota-In re Blodgett
21 2
Minnesota's sexually violent predator ("psychopathic personal-
ity") statute should be considered against this backdrop.213 The Min-
nesota statute provides for the civil commitment of any person found
to be a sexual psychopathic personality.214 The statute defines a "psy-
chopathic personality" as
the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instabil-
ity, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of
good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of [per-
sonal] acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render
such person irresponsible for [personal] conduct with respect to
sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons.215
207 See id. at 752.
208 See id. at 753.
209 See id. at 754.
210 See id.
211 See Rorie Sherman, Psychiatric Gulag or Wuse Safekeeping Lawmakers Use Civil Commit-
ment to Detain Sexual Predators, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 5, 1994, at Al.
212 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1994) (en banc).
213 On December 12, 1996, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld its state's sexually
dangerous persons act in In re Linehan, 557 N.W. 2d. 171 (Minn. 1996). The court found
that the law did not violate substantive due process, equal protection, ex post facto, or
double jeopardy under either the state or federal constitutions.
214 Mm4N. ANN. STAT. § 253B.02 (West. Supp. 1997).
215 Id. § 253B.02(18a).
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This statute, as construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Pearson
v. Probate Court of Ramsey County,216 applies only to persons who display
a "habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters" and "an utter lack
of power to control their sexual impulses" so that the persons will
likely "attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss,_pain or other evil on the
objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire."217 Similar to
the Washington statute, Minnesota's statute authorizes civil commit-
ment subsequent to the completion of a penal term.
Minnesota's historic psychopathic personality statute has survived
many constitutional challenges. 218 In Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Pro-
bate Court of Ramsey County,219 the Court upheld the statute against
vagueness, procedural due process, and equal protection chal-
lenges.220 Subsequently, in In re Blodgett,22 1 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the statute, which commits repeat sexual offenders to
a security hospital subsequent to the expiration of criminal sentences,
did not violate substantive due process.222 Blodgett unsuccessfully ar-
gued that Foucha v. Louisiana,223 a case in which the United States
Supreme Court required the state to prove mental illness and danger-
ousness in order to involuntarily commit an individual, demanded
that the Court declare Minnesota's sexual psychopath statute
unconstitutional.
22 4
As stated above, Foucha identified three instances of confinement
which may constitutionally deprive an individual of his or her liberty:
(1) imprisonment of convicted criminals for deterrence and retribu-
216 State ex rel Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 287 N.W. 297 (Minn.
1939), affd, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
217 Id. at 302.
218 Subsequent to the Supreme Court of Minnesota's opinion in In re Linehan, 518
N.W.2d 609 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1994), Minnesota's legislature amended its psychopathic per-
sonality laws. The Minnesota statutes now incorporate the Pearson test for sexual psycho-
pathic personality. See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02(18a) (West Supp. 1997). Additionally,
a separate category of sexually dangerous persons now exists. See id. §§ 253B.02(7a),
253B.02(18b). A "sexually dangerous person" must (1) have engaged in "harmful sexual
conduct" and (2) manifest a "sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction"
which makes them "likely to engage in [further] acts of harmful sexual conduct." Id.
§ 253B.02(18b); see Andrew Hammel, Comment, The Importance of Being Insane: Sexual
Predator Civil Commitment Laws and the Idea of Sex Cimes as Insane Acts, 32 Hous. L Rr . 775,
786-90 (1995) (discussing the Minnesota legislature's response to In re Linehan).
219 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
220 See id. at 274-77.
221 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1994) (en banc).
222 See id. at 914-16. See also Nicolaison v. Erickson, 65 F.3d 109 (8th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that the state did not violate the inmates' substantive due process rights despite the
alleged lack of a specific finding that he had utter lack of power to control his sexual
impulses).
223 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
224 Blodgett argued that Foucha overruled Minnesota ex reL Pearson, 309 U.S. 270 (1940),
the landmark case in which United States Supreme Court upheld the Minnesota Supreme
Court's narrow construction of the statute. See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914.
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tion; (2) confinement of persons mentally ill and dangerous; and, (3)
in "certain narrow circumstances, persons who pose a danger to
others or to the community may be subject to limited confinement."225
This case stands for the proposition that the Supreme Court, in three
instances, considers a state's interests compelling and the means nar-
rowly drawn to serve those interests. Essentially, the Supreme Court
anticipatorily determined the outcome of its balancing test in three
narrowly defined situations.
Blodgett explicitly argued that "although he may be socially mal-
adjusted, he is not in any way mentally ill. And if he is not ill, he may
not be confined by the state, unless and until convicted of another
crime."226 Invalidating the substantive due process challenge, the
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that Pearson may be a subset of
Foucha's mentally ill and dangerous category, or, alternatively, an addi-
tional category.227 Provided the civil commitment affords treatment
and periodic review, the court concluded that the statute did not vio-
late due process.228 The Foucha Court demanded proof of both
mental illness and dangerousness in order to constitutionally detain
an individual. The Minnesota Supreme Court thus reasoned that
Blodgett may be released if his sexual disorder goes into remission.229
This analysis, which considers release subsequent to the remission of a
mental disorder, is certainly consistent with the release of insanity ac-
quittees subsequent to a remission of insanity as mandated by the
225 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 78-81 (emphasis added) (offering a pretrial detention of dan-
gerous criminal defendants as an example of limited confinement).
226 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914.
227 The court did not consider the three categories in Foucha, exclusive. It mentioned
three other situations in which Minnesota provides for civil commitment without mental
illness-where the detainee is mentally retarded, chemically dependent, or a health threat
to others. See Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914 n.6; see also MiNN. STAT. §§ 253B.02(2) & (14)
(defining "mentally retarded" and "chemically dependant"), § 144.4172(8) (West Supp.
1997) (defining "health threat to others"). See Hammel, supra note 218, at 785
[T]he [Blodgett] majority neglected to explain why it felt entitled to create a
category of civil confinement "additional" to those allowed by Foucha when
the thrust of Foucha and other detention cases is not to create categories
but to carefully limit detention without trial and enunciate specific constitu-
tional guidelines for civil commitment procedures.
(footnotes omitted).
228 See Blodgett 510 N.W.2d at 916.
229 See id. In 1990, although confronted specifically with the issue of a right to treat-
ment, the Eighth Circuit declared Minnesota's psychopathic personality statute, which car-
ries an indeterminate commitment period, constitutionally valid. See Bailey v. Gardebring,
940 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1991). It interpreted Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), as
allowing the state to "confine people who pose a threat to themselves and others until the
danger has dissipated." SeeBailey, 940 F.2d at 1153. The court found the indefinite preven-
tive detention based on mere dangerousness alone constitutionally permissible. See id. at
1154. See Hammel, supra note 218, at 780-81.
NOTE-CONSTITUTIONAL IMPICATIONS
Foucha Court23 0 However, the court in Blodgett virtually ignored both
the mental illness requirement of Foucha and the indefiniteness of its
commitment and instead developed its own interpretation of the Min-
nesota statute.
c. Wisconsin-State v. Post
Under Wisconsin's Sexually Violent Person Commitments stat-
ute, 231 which also authorizes civil commitment subsequent to the com-
pletion of a penal sentence, the petition seeking commitment must
allege that the person:
has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudi-
cated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found
not guilty or not responsible for a sexually violent offense by reason
of insanity, mental disease, defect or illness and ... is dangerous
because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it sub-
stantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual
violence. 232
A hearing must occur within seventy-two hours of filing the petition to
determine whether probable cause exists that the subject of the peti-
tion falls within the definition of a sexually violent person.2 33 If the
petition fails to establish probable cause, the court must dismiss the
petition. However, if the petition establishes probable cause, the
court orders the individual transferred to a facility for evaluation.23 4
The statute entitles the person to a full adversarial trial.235
Once the court determines that the person is sexually violent, it
must commit him to the Department of Health and Social Services for
control, care, and treatment until he or she no longer meets the statu-
tory requirements.23 6 If committed to a treatment facility, the sexually
violent person may petition for supervised release every six months.
The court must grant the petition unless the state proves with clear
and convincing evidence that the person remains sexually violent and
will likely commit acts of sexual violence.2 37 In addition, the Secretary
of the Department of Health and Social Services may authorize the
filing of a petition for discharge at any time, and the court must grant
230 The Foucha court, however, explicitly differentiated civil committees from insanity
acquittees. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75-78.
231 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980 (West Supp. 1996).
232 Id. § 980.01(7).
233 See id. § 980.04(1)-(3).
234 See id.
235 See id. § 980.05.
236 See id. § 980.06(1).
237 See id. §§ 980.08(1), (4).
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the petition unless the state proves with clear and convincing evidence
that the prisoner remains a sexually violent predator.23 8
The committed person receives written notice of his or her right
to petition the court for discharge annually and in conjunction with
mental reexaminations. 239 Similar to Washington's statute, if prob-
able cause exists to believe the committed person no longer falls
within the definition of the statute, the court must hold a hearing on
the issue.2 40 The state again carries the burden to prove with clear
and convincing evidence that the person remains a sexually violent
predator.2 41 If the state falls to meet this standard, the state must dis-
charge the person from custody.2 42
In State v. Post,243 a 1995 case involving the civil commitment of a
sexually violent predator in Wisconsin, a civil committee brought a
substantive due process challenge against Wisconsin's sexually violent
predator statute. In 1976, the Eighth Circuit committed Samuel E.
Post to the custody of the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social
Services and confined him to the Mendota Mental Health Institute
subsequent to a conviction of two counts of sexual assault, armed rob-
bery, and false imprisonment "stemming from incidents in which he
abducted women from shopping mall parking lots and drove them to
remote locations where he forced them to engage in oral sex acts."
244
Before Post's scheduled release, the Department ofJustice filed a peti-
tion to commit Post as a sexually violent person.2 45 At the probable
cause hearing, the Forensic Clinical Director of the Mendota Mental
Health Institute testified that Post suffered primarily from an "antiso-
cial personality disorder with secondary atypical paraphilia."246
On the day of the probable cause hearing, Post filed a motion to
dismiss the commitment petition on the grounds that the statute vio-
lated certain constitutional protections.2 47 Granting the motions, the
circuit court found that the statute violated constitutional protections
against double jeopardy and ex post facto and constitutional guaran-
tees of equal protection and substantive due process.2 48 The Wiscon-
238 See id. §§ 980.09(1) (a)-(b).
239 See id. §§ 980.07(1), 980.09(2) (a).
240 See id. § 980.07(2)(b).
241 See id.
242 See id. §§ 980.09(2)(b) & (c).
243 541 N.W.2d 115 (Wisc. 1995).
244 Id- at 119.
245 See id.
246 Id. "[T]he essential feature of Antisocial Personality Disorders is a pervasive pat-
tern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others...." Id. at n.3 (citing the
American Psychiatric Association, DIAGNOSTIC AND MANUAL OF M.ArrL DisoRDEPs 645 (4th
ed. 1994)).




sin Supreme Court disagreed and ultimately concluded that because
the nature and duration of the Sexually Violent Person Commitments
statute249 reasonably relate to the State's compelling interests, the in-
voluntary commitments do not infringe upon the committee's sub-
stantive due process rights.
250
The Wisconsin Supreme Court defined the predator law as one
that restricts a fundamental liberty and, thus, requires application of
strict scrutiny in which "the challenged statute must further a compel-
ling state interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest."251
The court defined Wisconsin's dual interests as protecting the com-
munity from dangerous mentally disordered persons and providing
care and treatment to mentally disordered persons predisposed to
sexual violence. 252 The court found the state's interests both legiti-
mate and compelling.2
53
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Post focused much attention on
the distinction between mental disorder and mental illness. 254 Be-
cause the "Supreme Court has declined to enunciate a single defini-
tion that must be used as the mental condition sufficient for
involuntary mental commitments,"255 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that mental disorder as defined in Wisconsin's sexually violent
predator act satisfies the mental condition component required by
substantive due process. 256 Not surprisingly, the dissent disagreed
with the majority primarily "[b]ecause... [the statute] allows the in-
definite confinement of persons who have not been found to be men-
tally ill, [and therefore] ... beyond a reasonable doubt ... violates
substantive due process protections."257 In part, the dissent's conclu-
sion resulted from its criticism of the majority's inference that the
mental illness component "can be defined howsoever the state
pleases."2 8
249 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980 (West Supp. 1997).
250 See State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Wisc. 1995).
251 Id. at 122 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)).
252 Se id.
253 See id.
254 Id. at 122-24.
255 Id. at 123.
256 See id.
257 Id. at 145 (Abrahamson,J., dissenting).





A. Sexually Violent Predator Acts-Involuntary Commitment
Pursuant to Traditionally Recognized Sources of State
Power
This Part first explains the sources of the state's power to incapac-
itate individuals. It analyzes the substantive due process requirements
of civil commitment and attempts to define sexually violent predator
statutes under traditional sources of state power. Finally, this Part
predicts that the Supreme Court will uphold sexually violent predator
statutes on substantive due process grounds.
Determining whether sexually violent predator statutes are con-
stitutional first requires an understanding of the traditional sources of
a state's power to assert physical control over its citizens. The state's
power to detain individuals derives from one of two sources recog-
nized as legitimate by the Supreme Court: its police powers or its
parens patriae powers. 259 Police powers allow the state to protect the
community from "the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally
ill."260 That is, the state incapacitates individuals pursuant to civil pro-
ceedings solely to protect society under its police powers. Under its
parens patriae powers, the state provides care to citizens unable to care
for themselves because of emotional disorders or age.261 In essence,
the Supreme Court anticipatorily applied its strict scrutiny test to
these scenarios and determined that the resulting deprivation of indi-
vidual liberty was constitutionally legitimate.
1. Civil Commitment Pursuant to the State's Parens Patriae Powers
Parens patriae literally means "parent of the country"262 and refers
to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under
legal disability.263 The principle embodies the notion that the state
must care for individuals incapable of caring for themselves and, for
purposes of this Note, applies primarily to cases of civil commitment
of the emotionally disturbed.
Review of Robinson v. Calfornia2 uncovers the Court's willing-
ness to recognize the state's authority to involuntarily commit individ-
259 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
260 Id.
261 See id.
262 BLAcK's LAW DicrloNARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
263 See id.
264 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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uals pursuant to its parens patriae powers.2 65 The Robinson Court struck
down a statute authorizing criminal conviction of narcotic addicts
based on their status as addicts alone,266 but it condoned the establish-
ment of a program of involuntary confinement for compulsory treat-
ment.2 67 The Court recognized the state's ability to deal with victims
of human afflictions with mandatory treatment for "general health
and welfare."268 The Court defined persons addicted to narcotics as
"diseased and proper subjects for... treatment."269 If this analysis
remains sound today, the ability of the state to similarly commit sexu-
ally violent predators may be constitutionally permissible, specifically
in light of the professional opinion that compulsive, repeat sexual of-
fenders' behavior may be "controlled by the use of therapeutic tech-
niques similar to those used in the treatment of alcoholics and drug
addicts."2 70
Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Robinson presses on these
notions of mental illness and the state's ability to protect society while
treating individuals afflicted with various diseases.271 Douglas recog-
nized legal variations in the definition of insanity, but he dismissed
such differences and concluded that "however insanity is defined, it is
in end effect treated as a disease."2 72 Douglas then explicitly stated
that such afflicted people may be confined for treatment orfor protec-
tion of society.2 73 He reached this conclusion notwithstanding his in-
ability to define addiction as a disease or as a symptom of a mental or
psychiatric disorder.2 74 Justice Douglas considered addicts sick peo-
265 The Court did not define specifically under which powers the State acts, although
the Court appeared to condone commitment based on compulsory treatment rather than
protection of society in general.
266 The Court objected to conviction based on a status or condition, as opposed to the
more traditional and legally recognized volitional act. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 664-65.
267 See id.
268 Id. at 666. The Court did not define whose general health and welfare the State
would protect through quarantine, confinement, or sequestration. Although the Court
suggested compulsory treatment, it remained unclear whether the secluded treatment
sought to prevent danger to society, protect the individual from a previously existing dis-
ease, or both.
269 Id. at 667 n.8 (citing Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925)). At a minimum,
this reference to the Court's 1925 opinion sheds light on the fact that the Court itself
defines who is diseased and suitable for treatment. It also supports the proposition that
definitions of legal and clinical mental illness differ.
270 Lawrence Wright, A ReporterAt Large: A Rapist s Homecoming, THE NEw YORKER, Sept.
4, 1995, at 56.
271 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 668 (Douglass, J., concurring).
272 Id.
273 See id. at 668-69. Justice Douglas did not define the source from which the State
retains the power to confine individuals for either end, although he probably referred to
both the State's police and parens patriae powers.
274 See id. at 671-72. Although Justice Douglas noted that treatment for addicts is well-
known, he did concede the difficulty in curing addicts. Similarly, the prognosis for curing
sexually violent predators is poor and treatment modalities, although different, are not
1997]
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ple and on no uncertain terms authorized their confinement for treat-
ment or for the protection of society.
275
In another civil commitment case, Allen v. Illinois,276 the Supreme
Court did not classify the Illinois Act as one passed pursuant to the
state's police power or parens patriae. Instead, by declaring that "Illi-
nois' decision to supplement its parens patriae concerns with measures
to protect the welfare and safety of other citizens does not render the
Act punitive,"277 the Court developed a hybrid framework through
which the state can constitutionally commit individuals in civil pro-
ceedings. However, whether the state acts within its parens patriae pow-
ers in order to "provid[e] care to its citizens who are unable because
of emotional disorders to care for themselves" 278 is certainly suspect
when the class is one of sexual predators279 primarily because sexual
predators do care for themselves in the ordinary course of their exis-
tences. Capable of taking care of themselves on a day-to-day basis,
sexual predators do not fit within the class of persons for whom the
state traditionally attempts to care under its parens patriae powers.
Washington's sexually violent predator statute defines mental ab-
normality as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emo-
tional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to the
commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such per-
son a menace to the health and safety of others."280 It seems unlikely,
if not impossible, to equate this definition with the class of persons the
state legitimately commits under its parens patriae powers. These pow-
ers are primarily used to commit those found to be dangerous only to
themselves.281 However, Illinois's Sexual Predator Act, reviewed in Alen
v. Illinois,28 2 requires the existence of a mental disorder for more than
one year. The Allen majority defined the state's authority to commit
unknown to the psychiatric field. SeeWASH. REv. CODE § 71.09.010 (1992); see also Wright,
supra note 270, at 55 (discussing treatment sessions of sexually violent predators).
275 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 676.
276 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
277 Id. at 373.
278 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
279 See Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARv.
L. REv. 1288, 1293 (1966) ("Commitment for dangerousness to others serves the police
power; commitment for dangerousness to self reveals the government as guardian to those
members of the community unable to care for their own interests.").
280 WASH. RaV. CODE § 71.09.020(2) (1992).
281 See Howard R. Hawkins,Jr. & Paul O. Sullivan, Note, Due Process and the Development
of "Criminal" Safeguards in Civil Commitment Adjudications, 42 FORDHAm L. REv. 611, 616
(1974). One of the most difficult problems under this analysis remains the notion that the
State uses its parens patriae powers when an individual is dangerous to himself in order to
rehabilitate the mentally disturbed. This role benefits both the individual and society, and
essentially, the guardianship role becomes the goal of the State's police powers. See id. at
617; see Beatrice I. Bleicher, Compulsory Community Care for the Mentally X11 16 C.Ev.-MA-
SHALL L. REV. 93, 102 (1967).
282 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
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individuals pursuant to the statute under traditionally recognized
sources of power.28 3 Although not specifically confronted with the is-
sue of whether the scheme violated substantive due process, the Court
implicitly legitimized the state's authority to commit individuals with
mental disorders in order to protect society.
23 4
2. Civil Commitment Pursuant to the State's Police Powers
The state's power to commit individuals is not limited to its parens
patriae powers. Police powers, another source of the state's power to
involuntarily detain individuals, embody the
authority conferred by the American constitutional system in the
Tenth Amendment ... upon the individual states, and, in turn,
delegated to local governments, through which they are enabled to
... secure generally the comfort, safety, morals, health, and pros-
perity of its citizens by preserving the public order, preventing a
conflict of rights in the common intercourse of the citizens, and
insuring to each an uninterrupted enjoyment of all the privileges
conferred upon him or her by general laws.28 5
More specifically, the state can legitimately place restrictions on a per-
son's personal freedom for the protection of the public safety pursu-
ant to its police powers. For example, a state imprisons convicted
criminals in furtherance of deterrence and retribution principles pur-
suant to its police powers.2 86 Although subject to the limitations of
the Federal Constitution, the exercise of the state's police power al-
lows the state "to promote order, safety, security, health, morals and
283 See id. at 373. This conclusion results from the Supreme Court's declaration that
Illinois decided "to supplement its parens patriae concerns with measures to protect the
welfare and safety of other citizens." Id. The decision of the state to supplement its parens
patriae concerns with its police powers did not render its sexually violent predator statute
punitive. See id.
284 The limitations placed on the state's power to involuntarily commit individuals pur-
suant to its parens patriae power remains unclear. In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979), the Court referred to those "who are unable because of emotional disorders to
care for themselves." Id. at 426. In contrast, much commentary defines these individuals
as unable to make decisions on their own, specifically unable to decide for themselves
whether or not to pursue treatment. See Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il"
Theories and Procedures, 79 HARv. L REv. 1288, 1297 (1966); see alsoJohn Q. La Fond, An
Examination of the Purposes of Involuntaiy Civil Commitment, 30 Burr. L. Rxv. 499, 500 (1981)
(traditional parens patriae authority allows the State to care for the mentally ill persons
unable to act in their best interest); Grant H. Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome:
An Analysis of the Confinement of Mentally Ill Criminals and Ex-Criminals by the Department of
Correction of the State of New York, 17 Burr. L. RFv. 651, 652 (1968) (a person may become so
mentally ill that society requires his confinement for purposes of treatment); Hawkins &
Sullivan, supra note 281, at 616-17.
285 BLAcK's LAw DianoNAR 1156 (6th ed. 1990).
286 See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
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general welfare within constitutional limits and is an essential attri-
bute of government."2
87
a. Requirements of Addington v. Texas288-Proof of Mental
Illness and Dangerousness
i. The Dangerousness Requirement
States cannot use unfettered discretion in the exercise of their
police powers. Pursuant to the mandates of Addington v. Texas,289 the
state must prove that an individual is dangerous to himself and others
by a standard greater than the preponderance of the evidence in or-
der to commit him in civil proceedings. Pending criminal charges do
not establish dangerousness, 290 and similar to all other civil commit-
ments, the Equal Protection Clause requires ajudicial proceeding to
determine the dangerous propensities of a person nearing the expira-
tion of a prison term.291 Modem sexually violent predator laws re-
quire a finding of dangerousness. 292 The Supreme Court once
recognized that "past behavior may not be an adequate predictor of
future actions. Predictions of future behavior are complicated further
by the difficulties inherent in diagnosis of mental illness."293 A subse-
quent finding that a person committed a criminal act beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, however, indicates a propensity toward dangerous
behavior.294 Sexual predator laws, therefore, adequately satisfy the
due process dangerousness requirement
ii. The Mental Illness Requirement
In addition to the dangerousness requirement, Addington v.
Texas295 mandates proof of mental illness in order to involuntarily
commit an individual.296 Specifically, the Addington Court noted that
"[t] he state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in
providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional
disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its
police power to protect the community from the dangerous tenden-
cies of some who are mentally ill."297 The Supreme Court does not
287 BLACK'S LAw D~crIoNaRY 1156-57 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
288 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
289 Id.
290 SeeJackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 728 (1972).
291 See Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966).
292 See supra note 3.
293 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323-24 (1993).
294 SeeJones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983); see also Lynch v. Overholser,
369 U.S. 705, 714 (1962) (finding that the commission of a criminal act constitutes "strong
evidence" of dangerousness).
295 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
296 See id. at 426-27.
297 Id. at 426.
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attempt to define mental illness. 298 The Court only requires a show-
ing "that the individual suffers from something more serious than is
demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior"299 and defers to legislative
definitions of mental disease.3 00 In fact, in United States v. Salerno,301
the Court specifically interpreted Addington as permitting detention of
"mentally unstable individuals who present a danger to the public."3 02
Apparently, the Salerno Court would permit mental instability to fulfill
the mental illness prong and would not require more.
On the other hand, consistent with its prior holdings, the Court
in Foucha v. Louisiana °3 refused to allow the state to commit an indi-
vidual under a statute that disregarded the mental competence of the
person committed. The Foucha Court criticized the state's attempt to
hold indefinitely an individual with an antisocial personality that leads
to aggressive behavior-a disorder for which no effective treatment
exists.30 4 The Court expressed its concern that if it upheld the statute,
the state, by implication, might be entitled to confine convicted
criminals who complete their prison terms based on a personality dis-
order that leads to criminal conduct.3 05 The Court distinguished
mental illness and personality disorder, but only in the context of
Foucha's individual case. The challenged statute in Foucha allowed
release of the insanity acquittee if and only if he proved to the court
that he no longer presented a danger to himself or others.3 06 The
statute contained no component concerning mental illness or person-
ality disorder, and, therefore, authorized the state to commit individu-
als based on dangerousness alone.
298 See id.
299 Id. at 427.
300 SeeJones v. United States, 468 U.S. 365, 364 n.18 (1983)
"[T] he only certain thing that can be said about the present state of knowl-
edge and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not reached
finality ofjudgment" .... The lesson we have drawn is not that government
may not act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that courts should pay
particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments.
Id. (citations omitted).
301 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
302 Id. at 748-49.
The States have traditionally exercised broad power to commit persons
found to be mentally ill. The substantive limitations on the exercise of this
power and the procedures for invoking it vary drastically among the States.
The particular fashion in which the power is exercised-for instance,
through ... sexual psychopath laws .... reflects... [a] ... distinct [basis]
for commitment sought to be vindicated.
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736-37 (1972).
303 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
304 See id. at 78.
305 See id. at 82-83.
306 See id. at 73.
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In contrast to the statute at issue in Foucha, release under sexually
violent predator laws relies upon whether "the person's mental abnor-
mality or personality disorder has so changed that the person is not
likely to commit predatory acts of sexual violence."8 0 7 The statutes
contemplate both mental competence and dangerousness, and states,
therefore, confine sexually violent predators on more than danger-
ousness alone.308 In Foucha, whether the insanity acquittee continued
to be mentally ill or plagued by a personality disorder was irrelevant,
because the statute paid no heed to the inmate's mental health. Con-
sequently, Foucha does not summarily invalidate modern sexually vio-
lent predator laws, because these laws consider the existence of both a
mental disorder and dangerousness.30 9
Although civil commitment statutes must contain a mental illness
component, lower courts disagree as to whether the requirements of
sexually violent predator statutes adequately fulfill this criteria. In
State v. Post,310 the dissent highlighted a legitimate concern surround-
ing the state's ability to define mental illness. "Were there no limit on
a state's substantive power to commit individuals, a state could civilly
commit whole categories of criminal offenders such as intoxicated
drivers merely by branding them deviant and designating them men-
tally disordered."31' The dissent argued that
[t] he Foucha case teaches that states are not free to define any devi-
ancy they please as a mental illness and thereby commit to mental
hospitals anyone who might fit their definition.... The Foucha
Court underscored this point in holding that an insanity acquittee
with a diagnosed antisocial personality disorder could not be con-
fined as mentally ill.
3 12
The dissent, however, misconstrued the actual holding of Foucha.313
The Foucha Court decided only that a Louisiana law which allowed the
continued confinement of insanity acquittees based on dangerousness
alone violated the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause. 314 In addition, the Foucha Court specifically noted that "keep-
ing Foucha against his will in a mental institution is improper absent a
determination in civil commitment proceedings of current mental illness and
307 WASH. REv. CODE § 71.090.90 (1992).
308 Whether the predatory acts of sexual violence defines the personality disorder is
not the topic of this Note and will not be addressed. However, the issue certainly may
contribute to determining the constitutionality of these laws.
309 Clear and convincing evidence of mental illness refers to evidence that a person is
mentally ill only within the specific definition of the statute. See Reome v. Levine, 692 F.
Supp. 1046, 1050 (D. Minn. 1988).
310 541 N.W.2d 115 (Wisc. 1995).
311 Id. at 142.
312 Id. (citations omitted).
313 See supra Part IIA..1.e (discussing Foucha holding).
314 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 85 (1992).
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dangerousness."' 15 It follows, therefore, that the Court would permit
the insanity acquittee's detainment if the state followed appropriate
civil commitment procedures.
The Foucha holding warns legislators to draft civil commitment
statutes which include a mental illness prong, but it does not add sub-
stance to what constitutes a sufficient definition of mental illness. Be-
cause the Court in Allen v. Illinoi 16 dealt specifically with a sexually
violent predator statute, its analysis. deserves careful attention when
attempting to define the parameters of the mental illness requirement
for civil commitment. The Allen Court, in declaring the statute civil in
nature, explicitly stated that because "the State has chosen not to ap-
ply the Act to the larger class of mentally ill persons who might be
found sexually dangerous does not somehow transform a civil pro-
ceeding into a criminal one. '8 17 Based on the language used by the
Court, in addition to Illinois's requirement of proof of the existence
of a mental disorder, the Court implicitly defined mental disorder as a
subset of the larger class of mental illness. 318 Based on this reading
and without further analysis, the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act, promulgated pursuant to the state's police power to protect the
community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally
ill,319 does not violate the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause.320 Likewise, modem sexually violent predator statutes, which
require personality disorder or mental abnormality, may fit within this
categorical framework, and thus do not violate constitutional guaran-
tees of due process.
321
315 Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
316 478 U.S. 864 (1986).
317 Id. at 870.
318 See also Wisconsin v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 143 (Wisc. 1995) (Abrahamson, J., dis-
senting) ("mental illness 'may be a subset of that larger group of disorders known as
mental disorder'") (quoting psychologist Dr. Nood, who testified at trial) (alteration in
original).
319 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
320 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
321 The clinical significance of personality disorder and mental abnormality extends
logically from this discussion. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-Im-R) lists personality disorder as a mental illness, and possibly suffices to sustain the
mental illness requirement for involuntary commitment. See Brooks, supra note 10, at 722.
But see La Fond, supra note 4, at 761. Difficulty arises in asserting the significance of mental
abnormality. Professor Brooks defines mental abnormality as "a legal term, intended to
convey a form of pathology that leads to violent sexual offenses." Brooks, supra note 10, at
780. Brooks refers to the professional opinion of Dr. Gene Abel of Emory University Medi-
cal School, who commented that sex offenders' "compulsive, repetitive, driven behavior,
which at times has no rational, logical reward, appears to fit the criteria of an emotional or
psychological illness." Id. at 780 (quoting GENE G. ABEL & JOANNE L. RouLAu, Male Sex
Offenders, in HANDBOOK OF OuTPATITr TREATmEN" OF ADULTS 271 (Michael E. Thase et al.
eds., 1990)). Justifying the absence of mental abnormality from the DSM-Ill-R, Professor
Brooks refers to the manual as an "evolving and imperfect document." Id. at 733. Brooks
hypothesizes that "the leaders of the psychiatric profession seem to be unwilling to accept
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Similarly, Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in O'Connor
v. Donaldson,3 22 a civil commitment case, expressly affirmed the state's
authority to confine individuals solely to protect society from "the
dangers of significant antisocial acts."3 23 Burger specifically catego-
rized Minnesota's psychopathic personality statute which targets sex-
ual offenders as one passed pursuant to the state's police powers, but
he did not require that the statute specifically define mental illness.
3 24
Legislators and judges certainly encounter difficulties when at-
tempting to attach legal definitions to mental illness, and employing
resources outside of the legal domain does not satisfactorily facilitate
the task. The professional psychiatric community, likewise, en-
counters difficulty when dealing with appropriate classifications of
sexual deviants. One author offers a useful definition of sex offenders
as
"individuals who are ultimately convicted for committing overt acts
for their immediate sexual gratification that are contrary to the pre-
vailing sexual mores of their society and thus are legally punishable.
Such individuals are distinguished from sexually deviant individuals
sexual misbehaviors such as rape as a diagnosis for fear that such a diagnosis could be used
to establish a psychiatric excuse for escaping punishment." Id. at 732. Conversely, the
Washington State Psychiatric Association invalidated any psychiatric basis for the terms
personality disorder or mental abnormality. See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 750
(W.D. Wash. 1995) (citing Amicus Brief, Washington State Psychiatric Association, at 7).
Clearly, sharp disagreement exists as to the validity of the terms employed and their mean-
ings as legal and clinical evaluations intersect. For a detailed explanation of the psychiatric
diagnosis, see Hammel, supra note 218, at 803-04.
322 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
323 Id. at 582-83. Justice Burger cited Minnesota ex reL Pearson v. Probate Court of
Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270 (1940), to lend support to his proposition. In Pearson, the
Court upheld Minnesota's psychopathic personality statute as not unconstitutionally vague
and not violative of equal protection or procedural due process. The statute defined psy-
chopathic personality as
"the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or
impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judg-
ment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a combina-
tion of any such conditions, as to render such person irresponsible for his
conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other
persons."
Minnesota ex. rel. Pearson, 309 U.S. 270, 272 (quoting 1939 MINN. LAWS chap. 369 § 1).
This law mirrors the modern sexually violent predator laws.
324 Justice Burger's reference to Minnesota ex reL Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey
County, 309 U.S. 270 (1940), in his discussion of constitutionally permissible delegations of
the State's police power sheds light on the substantive due process issue. One commenta-
tor noted that a court "will reach what is essentially a substantive due process conclusion by
striking down a state commitment scheme as vague and overly broad." La Fond, supra note
284, at 516-17 (footnotes omitted). Would La Fond argue the Court essentially reached a
substantive due process conclusion when it determined Minnesota's psychopathic person-
ality statute, 1939 MimN. LAws chap. 369, § 1, not unconstitutionally vague? See Minnesota
ex ret Pearson, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
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who commit the same acts but have never been adjudicated in con-
nection with their behavior."
3 25
In the treatment of sexual offenders, many experts define rapists as
mentally ill individuals, while others define rape as a purely criminal
act.3 26 Similar to the current lack of an agreed upon definition in the
legal community, an adequate psychiatric categorization of the sexual
offender remains elusive.
b. Government's Regulatory Interest in Community SafetyP
27
Difficulties in determining whether sexually violent predators are
mentally ill may be disregarded if the permissibility of their commit-
ment can be defined outside of the limitations prescribed in Foucha v.
Louisiana.3 28 Although limited, the state's use of its police power ex-
tends beyond situations in which potential civil committees are found
to be both mentally ill and dangerous. In United States v. Salerno,
329
the Supreme Court declared that the Due Process Clause does not
create an impenetrable wall that "no governmental interest-rational,
important, compelling, or otherwise-may surmount."33 0 The Salerno
Court listed situations in which the Court previously approved of vari-
ous detention schemes,33' but it failed to define any limitations on, or
possible sources of, the state's power. The Court conceded that a gen-
eral rule of substantive due process prohibits the government from
detaining a person prior to a judgment of guilt in a criminal trial, but
it quickly highlighted the number of exceptions to this rule that Con-
gress created and the Court upheld.
33 2
The Salerno Court employed the strict scrutiny test in order to
uphold the Bail Reform Act. Salerno's majority found the govern-
ment's interest in preventing crime by arrestees legitimate and com-
pelling and the Bail Reform Act narrowly focused "on a particularly
acute problem in which the Government interests are overwhelm-
ing."3 33 The Court next recognized an individual's strong interest in
liberty as a fundamental right.33 4 Finally, the Court noted the long
history of cases holding that an individual's liberty interest "may, in
circumstances where the government's interest is sufficiently weighty,
325 SCisVARrZ & GELLINI, supra note 14, at 2-2.
326 See id.
327 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987).
328 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
329 Salerno, 481 U.S. 739.
330 Id. at 748 (citations omitted).
331 See id. at 748-49.
332 See id. at 749.




be subordinated to the greater needs of society."33 5 Without more,
the court upheld the Bail Reform Act on due process grounds.
336
Some courts have analyzed the sexually violent predator statutes
in a similar manner.337 The Salerno decision authorizes states to legiti-
mately deprive individuals of constitutionally protected rights in cer-
tain situations, provided those situations withstand strict scrutiny. If
sexually violent predator laws withstand strict scrutiny, then the laws
should be upheld. The involuntary commitment of sexual predators
involves a compelling state interest, and the statutes arguably are nar-
rowly focused, both procedurally and in relation to the class of per-
sons they effect. In State v. Post,33 8 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
recognized "the state's compelling interest in protecting society...
through the commitment and treatment of those identified as most
likely" to commit acts of sexual violence.
339
In Post, the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied the strict scrutiny
test and defined the dual interests of the state-protecting the com-
munity from dangerous mentally disordered individuals and provid-
ing care and treatment to those individuals predisposed to sexual
violence.340 The court referred to the Supreme Court's recognition
of the legitimacy of these interests under both the state's police pow-
ers and parens patriae powers. 341 The Wisconsin Supreme Court em-
phasized the important distinction between statutory definitions of
mental illness and mental disorder which serve a legal function and
clinical definitions of these terms which serve a medical function.3 42
The court warned of the "significant risk of misunderstanding when
descriptions designed for clinical use are transplanted into the foren-
sic setting."343
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court conceded the potential
indefiniteness of the predator inmate's confinement, it concluded
that the purposes of commitment reasonably related to the. dura-
tion.344 Because an individual's commitment ends when the individ-
ual no longer suffers from a mental disorder, treatment of the mental
335 Id. at 750-51.
336 The Court's willingness to uphold the Act stemmed, in part, from the procedural
safeguards instituted in detaining arrestees. Most criticism of involuntary commitment
schemes in case law focuses on the state's failure to afford adequate procedural due pro-
cess. La Fond, supra note 284, at 506.
337 See, e.g., State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115 (Wisc. 1995).
338 Id.
339 Id. at 118.
340 See id. at 122.
341 See id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)).
342 See id. at 123 (citing the warning of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV)).
343 Id.
344 See id. at 127.
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condition, then, links directly to duration.3 45 The court concluded
that "[p] rotection of the community is also well-served by [the] statu-
tory scheme because the danger to the public has necessarily dissi-
pated when treatment has progressed sufficiently to warrant an
individual's release."3
46
The dissent found no rational basis for civil commitment under
the challenged statute.3 47 Instead, the dissent underscored the need
for a more reliable definition of mental illness, although it conceded
that the Supreme Court never attempted to establish an exact defini-
tion.348 The dissent implicitly argued that the civil commitment
scheme only withstands strict scrutiny if the statute requires both
mental illness and dangerousness.3 49 The dissent noted that if
"mental illness or a 'mental condition component' means whatever a
state claims it means, a constitutionally required threshold for depri-
vation of liberty would be transformed into a meaningless standard
signifying whatever state legislatures want it to signify."350 The dissent
highlighted the inconsistencies currently confronting courts ruling on
substantive due process challenges to the involuntary commitment of
sexually violent predators. These inconsistencies result from deficient
guidance but do not demand the conclusion that the commitment
scheme violates due process.
3 5 1
Although Supreme Court precedent insufficiently guides the
lower courts in determining the adequacy of mental illness compo-
nents, the Court in Foucha v. LouisianaP52 found a statute devoid of a
mental illness component unconstitutional. In Foucha,3 53 the
Supreme Court attempted to distinguish the confinement of insanity
acquittees under the Louisiana scheme from the pretrial detention
authorized by the Bail Reform Act which was upheld in United States v.
Salero. 54 In Salerno, "the duration of confinement under the Act was
strictly limited" and the government carried the burden of demon-
strating with clear and convincing evidence that the "arrestee presents
an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the commu-
345 See id.
346 Id.
347 See id. at 142 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
348 See id.
349 See id.
350 Id. at 143.
351 The dissent concluded that the majority opinion relied on a circular definition of
mental disorder premised on dangerousness which detains individuals considered danger-
ous regardless of whether they have a mental illness. See id. at 143-44. Other courts criti-
cize this circular reasoning in determining sexually violent predator laws unconstitutional
because they lack a mental illness component. See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744
(W.D. Wash. 1995).
352 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
353 Id.
354 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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nity."355  Conversely, Louisiana's statute required the detainee to
prove that he was not dangerous without regard to his mental stabil-
ity.356 The Court found the Foucha scheme not carefully limited,
although it did not expand on this conclusion or state how legislatures
could more narrowly draft the statute.
In declaring the Louisiana scheme unconstitutional, the Foucha
Court noted that "in Salerno... the detention... found constitution-
ally permissible was strictly limited in duration" by the Speedy Trial
Act.3 57 Although the Foucha Court disapproved of the indefiniteness
of the Louisiana statute, this dissatisfaction apparently resulted from
both its indefiniteness and lack of a mental illness requirement
358
Foucha359 stands solely for the proposition that a state may not indefi-
nitely hold an insanity acquittee who has been cured of his mental
illness but is still a danger to himself and others. The Foucha majority,
however, expressly affirmed "the holding of [the Court's] cases that a
convicted criminal may not be held as a mentally ill person without
following the requirements for civil commitment, which would not
permit further detention based on dangerousness alone.13 60
The Foucha Court noted the unconstitutionality of commitment
based on either dangerousness or mental illness.3 61 In its analysis, the
Court compared Louisiana's commitment statute with the standard
upheld in Salerno in which the Court required compelling state inter-
ests and a narrowly tailored scheme. As Justice Thomas pointed out in
his dissenting opinion, the Foucha Court "never explain[ed] if we are
dealing here with a fundamental right .... [and] never disclose[d]
what standard of review applies."3 62 Justice Thomas noted that the
355 Id. at 751.
356 The Court consistently criticized the State's scheme for seeking "to perpetuate
Foucha's confinement.., on the basis of his antisocial personality." Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 78 (1992). The flaw in this line of reasoning surfaces upon a closer inspection
of the statute which disregarded the committees mental condition and required only proof
of dangerousness. The Court relied on the findings of the two-member sanity commission
that Foucha "evidenced no signs of psychosis or neurosis and was in 'good shape' men-
tally.... [Hie had, however, an antisocial personality, a condition that is not a mental
disease and that is untreatable." Id. at 75.
357 Id. at 82 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987)).
358 This assumption extends logically from the holding in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418 (1979), which permitted the indefinite commitment of an individual both mentally ill
and dangerous.
359 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
360 Id. at 83 n.6. The majority referred to this line of cases in order to rebut the ration-
ale of the dissent. In doing so, however, the Court further described the criteria necessary
to involuntarily detain an individual in a civil commitment proceeding. something more
than dangerousness alone. Again, the Court did not define additional requirements,
although the unidentified element appears to be the presence of a mental illness, mental
abnormality, or personality disorder.
361 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75 (1992).
362 Id. at 116 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Court "appears to advocate a heightened standard [of review] hereto-
fore unknown in our case law."3 63
A statute that satisfies Foucha's requirements will withstand strict
scrutiny, but defining constitutionally permissible civil commitment
statutes as those that contain both mental illness and dangerousness
components may be underinclusive. Another category may exist
under which the Supreme Court will categorize sexually violent
predator statutes, similar to the analysis of the Minnesota Supreme
Court in In re Blodgett. In In re Blodgett,864 the Supreme Court of Min-
nesota defined the state's psychopathic personality statute as a subset
of Foucha's mentally ill and dangerous category, or alternatively, an
additional category. The court defined the psychopathic personality
as "an identifiable and documentable violent sexually deviant condi-
tion or disorder."365 Beyond these conclusions, the court did not ex-
plain the mental illness requirement, and consequently created an
additional category of legitimate civil commitment based on proof of
a deviant disorder and dangerousness.
The Supreme Court may uphold civil commitment schemes
based on the state's regulatory interest in community safety, but it may
be unnecessary to classify sexually violent predator statutes under this
framework. Instead, the acts possibly fall within the state's authority
to detain dangerous persons through constitutionally permissible civil
commitment proceedings pursuant to its police powers.
3. The Signficance of Treatment
Although the Washington legislature found sexually violent
predators unamenable to existing psychiatric treatment modalities, it
nevertheless found "the treatment needs of this population very long
363 Id. at 117. Justice Thomas noted that the majority invalidated the statute because it
violated "some general substantive due process right to 'freedom from bodily restraint'
that triggers strict scrutiny." Id. Thomas considered this analysis dangerously wrong. See
id. In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), the Court noted that "[a] t the least, due
process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable rela-
tion to the purpose for which the individual is committed." This analysis seems to allow
the civil commitment of an individual found to have a mental abnormality who engaged in
sexual predatory acts. Commitment laws, of course, seek to protect the public, as well as
treat the individuals committed. Similarly, in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574
(1975), the Court determined that a State must have "a constitutionally adequate purpose
for the confinement." According toJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the State
legitimately enacts laws for the protection of public health, safety, morals, and welfare.
This authority must be exercised to further legitimate public interests through means ra-
tionally related to that end. When such state action infringes upon fundamental liberties,
the interests sought must be compellingand the means pursued must be narrowly tailored.
See La Fond, supra note 284, at 501 n.7; Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the
Mentally X, 87 Atv. L Rav. 1190 (1974).
364 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1994).
365 Id. at 915.
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term, and the treatment modalities for this population very different
than the traditional treatment modalities for people appropriate for
commitment under the involuntary treatment act."3 66 In 1975, in
O'Connor v. Donaldson,3 67 the Supreme Court declined the opportunity
"to decide whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to
others have a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the
state." 68 However, four years later in Addington v. Texas,369 the Court
specifically required the extension of care to civil committees de-
tained pursuant to the State's parens patriae powers, while only requir-
ing protection of the community when the state detains dangerous
mentally ill individuals.37 0 If appropriately categorized under the
state's police powers, the sexually violent predator statutes do not
have to include a treatment component. They must, however, be pre-
mised upon a finding of mental illness, a legal term still undefined by
the Supreme Court.
371
Because the Supreme Court in Allen v. Illinois372 defined Illinois's
Sexually Violent Predator Act in terms of the state's parens patriae
power, other predator statutes should be analyzed in a similar man-
ner. Determining the state's legitimate interest in treating sexual of-
fenders,3 73 the Allen majority legitimized Illinois's civil commitment
scheme under the state's parens patriae power.3 74 Under this analysis,
366 WASH. REv. CODE § 71.09.010 (1992).
867 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
368 Id. at 573.
369 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
370 See id. at 426. But see Beth Keiko Fiimoto, Comment, Sexual Vwlence, Sanity, and
Safety: Constitutional Parameters for Involuntay Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 15 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REv. 879, 888 (1992) ("The constitutionally permissible purpose of police power
involuntarily civil commitment is to treat the individual's mental illness and to protect the
person and society from the person's potential dangerousness.").
371 Again, the question arises as to exactly how the Court defines mental illness. Be-
cause the Court continuously uses mental illness, mental disorder, and like terms inter-
changeably, satisfactory fulfillment of the mental illness prong which meet constitutional
requirements remain unclear. See supra Part III.2.a.ii.
372 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
373 Sexual offender treatment remains a very primitive area. See Wright, supra note
270, at 62. One therapist, Kay Jackson, believes the therapeutic relationship offered
through therapy changes people in the long run. See id. However, among the twenty ther-
apists at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center in Avenel, New Jersey, one of the
largest facilities in the world devoted exclusively to the treatment of sex offenders, no con-
sensus exists on what programs successfully treat sexual offenders. See id.
874 In his Comment, Andrew Hammel refers to the Allen Court's emphasis on the im-
portance of providing treatment for the mentally ill. See Hammel, supra note 218, at 800.
Hammel interprets this emphasis as "central to the determination of whether the statutory
scheme is considered truly civil." Id. at 801. Thus, "treatment ... designed to effect recov-
ery" must be provided by the state if and only if it is acting pursuant to its parens patriae
power. In Allen, the Court was not persuaded that the state was acting in accordance with
this power, because the Petitioner did not demonstrate, nor did the record suggest, that
conditions of confinement of sexually dangerous persons in Illinois were "incompatible
with the State's asserted interest in treatment." Allen, 478 U.S. at 373.
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committed individuals need only have an emotional disorder. The
State does not need to meet the mental illness standard required for
the commitment of individuals pursuant to its police powers. Thus, so
long as the state treats sexual offenders while incapacitated, it legiti-
mately uses its power to commit emotionally disordered individuals.3 75
Washington's statute, similar to the statutes in the fifteen other juris-
dictions which have sexual predator laws,376 requires both care and
treatment. 3 77
B. The Constitutionality of Modem Sexually Violent Predator
Laws-Substantive Due Process Limitations
Based on Supreme Court precedent, modem sexually violent
predator laws ultimately should be upheld by the Court on substantive
due process grounds. However, the Supreme Court conceivably will
be prompted to more carefully delineate the limitations on the state's
authority to incapacitate individuals. Specifically, because lower
courts express concern about precise definitions of mental illness, the
Court may guide the lower courts, as well as state legislatures, by pro-
viding a satisfactory definition of the mental illness prong required in
Foucha v. Louisiana.3 78
Initially, the Court must decide under what authority the state
derives its power to involuntarily commit sexual predators. If the
state acts legitimately through its parens patriae power, then treatment
must be the primary concem.3 79 However, if the state acts pursuant to
its police powers, then the existence of a mental illness must be
375 Many articles do not differentiate the state's police power from its parens patriae
power. See Brooks, supra note 10, at 715. Although no specific Supreme Court case stands
for the proposition that involuntary civil commitment of mentally disordered and danger-
ous individuals is constitutional, a history of unchallenged precedent certainly exists.
376 Minnesota's psychopathic personality statute requires treatment, an issue explored
in In re Blodgett. 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1994). The court conceded that the treatment
requirement is problematic, but also stated that "it is not clear that treatment for the psy-
chopathic personality never works." Id. at 916. The court ultimately concluded that so
long as the civil commitment scheme seeks to provide both treatment and periodic review,
due process is not violated.
377 WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.080 (1992).
378 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
379 State courts inconsistently define the mental status of sexually violent predators.
For instance, in In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993) habeas corpus granted sub nom. Young
v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (en banc), the court noted "at the outset
that there are good reasons to treat mentally ill people differently than violent sex offend-
ers." Id. at 1010. It then referred,to a case in which the Illinois Supreme Court concluded
that "[a] sexually dangerous person 'creates different societal problems, and his past con-
duct is different in degree and kind from the conduct of persons in the larger, more inclu-
sive class defined under the Mental Health Code." Id. (quoting People v. Pembrock, 62
Ill.2d 317, 322 (1976)). The Washington Supreme Court nonetheless determined that the
sexually violent predator statute satisfied the mental illness requirement. See In reYoung,
857 P.2d at 1001.
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proved and treatment concerns disappear. Alternatively, the Supreme
Court may decide that these civil commitment schemes fall under a
third category, defined in Foucha as "certain narrow circumstances, [in
which] persons who pose a danger to others or to the community may
be subject to limited confinement."380 The Supreme Court may also
uphold sexually violent predator laws as constitutional based on the
government's well-established authority to subordinate an individual's
liberty interest to the greater needs of society based, again, on the
state's police power.381
The Supreme Court will certainly face a difficult challenge if it
attempts to more carefully define mental illness3 8 2 in the context of
the state's police power.383 "There are as many definitions of the term
'sex offender' as there are individuals doing the defining.... Every
state uses the label differently according to its legislative statutes."
38 4
If the Court continues to use mental illness interchangeably with
other psychiatric terms indicating some abnormality, then the civil
commitment schemes articulated in the sexually violent predator laws
certainly could withstand constitutional scrutiny. However, as specifi-
cally found by the Washington Task Force, individuals affected by the
Sexual Predator Act do not necessarily suffer from classic mental ill-
380 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80. The Supreme Court probably would not consider sexual
predator laws to fall within this category, specifically because sexual predator laws are po-
tentially indefinite, and this category requires limited confinement. Similarly, the Court
probably would not determine that the procedural safeguards written into the sexual
predator laws create a limited term of confinement analogous to the Speedy Trial Act
which, in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the Court found to be a sufficient
guarantee of limited confinement. However, the Court referred to the Speedy Trial Act in
the context of its conclusion that "the incidents of pretrial detention [are not] excessive in
relation to the regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve." Id. at 747. The reference to
length of detention related to the determination of the nature of the act as punitive or
regulatory is an inquiry not addressed in this analysis. In fact, the Salerno Court concluded
that the Due Process Clause does not "prohibit[ I pretrial detention on the ground of
danger to the community as a regulatory measure, without regard to the duration of the
detention." Id. at 748.
381 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-52.
382 One commentator suggests that a diagnosis that may subject an individual to con-
finement should at least be reasonably well defined and accepted in the psychiatric com-
munity. See Hammel, supra note 218, at 802. The author proposes that "[t]he condition
should be treatable, and it should be the cause of the dangerous conduct for which one is
being incarcerated." Id.
383 In Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995), the district court ruled the
Washington Sexually Violent Predator Statute to be unconstitutional because of the ab-
sence of the mental illness requirement, apparent both in the statutory language and legis-
lative history. See id. at 749-50. The court relied on the Amicus Brief submitted by the
Washington State Psychiatric Association as well as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in
order to conclude that the Washington legislature intended to capture more than the seri-
ously mentally ill by employing a term unrecognized in the psychiatric community. See id.
at 750 n.2.
384 ScHwARTz & CEUJrNi, supra note 14, at 2-2.
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ness.3 8 5 The Washington State legislature admittedly passed the Sex-
ual Predator Act in order to detain violent sexual predators who did
not fall under the restrictive definition of the previously existing com-
mitment law.386 Although one commentator stated that courts define
mental illness as "a condition manifested by significant cognitive,
emotional, or behavioral impairments which ought to have legal sig-
nificance,"387 the Supreme Court has never defined the term in such
specific language.
The difficulty in determining the constitutionality of modem sex-
ual predator laws results, in part, from the Court's inadequately de-
fined limitations on the state's power to involuntarily commit
individuals. As early as 1972, the Court became aware of the need to
resolve the issues embodied in sexually violent predator statutes. 388
However, "[g]uideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this un-
charted area of substantive due process [remain] scarce and open-
ended."389 Based on precedent as well as the specific language found
in Supreme Court opinions, the Court may conceivably uphold sexual
predator laws against a substantive due process challenge. However, it
seems more likely that the Court will simultaneously choose to limit
the power of the state to involuntarily commit individuals pursuant to
civil proceedings. 390
385 See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 750 & n.3 (noting the testimony of one
member of the Task Force describing Earl Shriner as clearly a problem and clearly very
dangerous, but not suffering from a classic mental illness).
386 See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (1992). The district court which recently ruled
Washington's law unconstitutional compared the original involuntary commitment stat-
ute's use of medically recognized terms against the challenged statute's deliberate use of
medically valueless terms. The legislature recognized the existing involuntary treatment
act as a "short-term civil commitment system... primarily designed to provide short-term
treatment." Id. In contrast, appropriate treatment for sexually violent predators is long
term, and the legislature found the existing commitment act inappropriate for this group,
possibly based on their treatment needs and defining characteristics. See id.
387 La Fond, supra note 284, at 509. This conclusion resulted from an equal protection
analysis of classifications based on mental illness. La Fond predicted that "courts will prob-
ably find mental illness to be a relevant personal characteristic for distinguishing among
persons in order to achieve legitimate state objectives." Id. Dismissing equal protection
challenges, La Fond did not define mental illness with any more precision than the Court.
388 SeeJackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972) ("Considering the number of per-
sons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the substantive constitutional limitations on
[the States broad power to commit persons found to be mentally ill] have not been more
frequently litigated.") (foomote omitted).
389 Pettco Enter. v. White, 896 F. Supp. 1137, 1147 (M.D. Ala. 1995), aff'd without op.,
Pettco Enter. v. White, 98 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
390 The Court may uphold sexual predator laws as a legitimate use of the State's power
to incapacitate individuals who pose a danger to society and simultaneously need treat-
ment for an existing disorder. The Court may question the State's motives in a commit-
ment scheme authorizing treatment subsequent to completion of a penal term that
provides no treatment. Although Baxstrom v. Herold 383 U.S. 107 (1966), authorized the
States to involuntarily commit individuals subsequent to a completed penal term for both
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Based on the Court's own analysis in Allen v. Minois,391 the state's
authority to involuntarily commit sexual predators derives from its
parens patriae authority and is supplemented by its concerns with pro-
tecting the welfare and safety of other citizens. Unfortunately, when
applied to sexual predators, this analysis breaks down, because this
power legitimates itself only when used to detain a class of citizens
incapable of caring for themselves. In addition, under the parens pa-
triae guise, the state's primary motive involves treatment and care for
that class. More conceivably, the state acts pursuant to its police pow-
ers primarily to protect society from a class of dangerous, mentally dis-
turbed individuals and, to a lesser degree, to provide treatment.
3 92
CONCLUSION
Based on a careful reading of Supreme Court precedent concern-
ing the involuntary commitment of individuals in civil proceedings,
modern sexually violent predator laws should survive a substantive
due process challenge. The Court may redefine limitations on the
state's authority to involuntarily commit individuals who pose a dan-
ger to society, and it may also be concerned with the logical, albeit
theoretical, extensions of the state's power to detain dangerous per-
sons.393 But because modern sexually violent predator laws provide
adequate procedural protection and pursue compelling state objec-
tives with narrowly-tailored means, the Court may be willing to uphold
these laws on this ground alone. However, more conceivably, the
Court will define the state's authority under its police powers, parens
patriae powers, or some hybrid framework through which the state
provides treatment and incapacitates sexual predators for the protec-
tion of society.
confinement and care, Baxstrom served his criminal sentence in an institution under the
jurisdiction and control of the New York Department of Correction used to confine and
care for mentally ill patients. See id. at 108. This situation differs dramatically from mod-
em sexually violent predator laws in which treatment is only sought subsequent to the
completion of the penal term, an aspect which calls into question the state's interest in
rehabilitation as opposed to retribution.
391 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
392 See WASH. Rv. CODE § 71.09.010 (1992) (treatment of sexually violent predators is
long term and the prognosis for curing offenders is poor).
393 See Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 276-77 (1940):
We fully recognize the danger of a deprivation of due process in proceed-
ings dealing with persons charged with ... a psychopathic personality ....
and the special importance of maintaining the basic interests of liberty in a
class of cases where the law though 'fair on its face and impartial in appear-
ance' may be open to serious abuses in administration and courts may be
imposed upon if the substantial rights of the persons charged are not ade-
quately safeguarded at every stage of the proceedings.
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The Supreme Court once inadequately defined the state's police
powers as "incapable of any very exact definition or limitation."
394
The Court must now determine a more exact definition or limitation,
or, at the very least, determine whether the sixteen states that have
adopted sexually violent predator laws modeled after Washington's
legislation exceeded the scope of their power and unconstitutionally
deprived a class of offenders of its constitutionally guaranteed liberty.
Although the state may attempt to protect the public from persons
considered extremely dangerous, it can not do so at the expense of
the constitutionally guaranteed liberties of that dangerous popula-
tion. The question facing the Court involves the extent to which the
state can protect the innocent where the penal system proves insuffi-
cient.3 95 Based on the explicit words of the Supreme Court, the an-
swer remains that these states acted pursuant to and within the scope
of their power, but the Court will now answer this question on its own.
Deborah L. Monis
394 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872). The Court determined
that the "security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an
existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life" de-
pend on the state's police power. Id.
395 How can criminal or civil laws adequately deal with sexually violent predators? The
case of Donald Chapman serves as another example of the overwhelming danger these
offenders pose to society. Chapman asked permission to remain at the Diagnostic and
Treatment center, but the State lacked the legal authority to keep him in prison absent
another crime committed. See Wright, supra note 270, at 59. In the opinion of three psy-
chiatrists, "Chapman was not psychotic, which is to say that he was not suffering from hallu-
cinations or thought disorders; therefore, he was not 'mentally ill' in the legal sense and
they could find no justification for locking him away in an institution." Id. Although he
"'represent[ed] a clear and present danger to others, because of his sexualized rage, deep-
seated feelings of low self-esteem and resentment and fears of others,'" Chapman was re-
leased from confinement. Id. He now remains committed in a psychiatric hospital until
the NewJersey Supreme Court hears his appeal concerning the provision in Megan's Law
(NewJersey's sexual psychopath statute) that redefines mental illness in order to facilitate
civil commitment of potentially dangerous sex offenders. See id. at 68.
